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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts a preliminary estimate of the 
influence of population growth on macro-economic growth as 
well as on economic development in China since 1949. In the 
first chapter, it is proposed that three variables, the 
socio-economic systems, population dynamics and economic 
development, are inextricably interwoven in Chinese society. 
Therefore, when studying the impacts of population growth 
on economic development in China since 1949, the influence 
of socio-economic systems must be considered. Chapter Two 
and Chapter Three review histories of population and economy 
in the People's Republic of China since 1949. The two 
chapters also historically examine the feedback interplay 
between population growth and economic development in China.
In Chapter Four, the impacts of population growth as 
well as the impacts of increases in the labour force on 
macro-economic growth in China since 1949 are examined. It 
is estimated that increments in labour force contributed 
about 40 per cent of the increase of GDP in China from 1953 
to 1985. The statistical analysis in this chapter shows 
that there are no significant correlations between 
population growth and macro-economic growth. The influence 
of population growth on economic development in China since 
1949 is examined and national welfare also defined in 
Chapter Four. Based on the function of increase of 
national welfare, it is found population growth in China 
since 1949 has had a strong adverse impact on the 
improvement of Chinese well-being. Finally the macro-costs 
of population growth in China since 1952 are estimated. In 
summary, although China's population growth shows complex 
interplay mechanisms with the economy, it can be concluded 
that population growth does have negative impacts on 
economic development.
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1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
"...the expectations that once focussed on reinter­
preting China's past in terms of class conflict are 
now centred on population and related variables.”
---  Gilbert Rozman (1982a)
1-1 The Objectives of the Study
Among the issues of national concern pertaining to 
current and prospective problems and challenges to China, 
both birth control and economic development claim prominent 
places. Since 1978, GNP per capita of U.S$ 800 by the year 
2000 has been a target for China's socio-economic
development. In order to achieve the goal, on the one hand, 
the Chinese government makes every effort to generate 
sustained increase of economic growth; on the other hand, 
it proposed a population control goal of 1.2 billion by the 
end of this century. So the achievement of the socio­
economic development target is per se an issue of the 
interrelationship between population growth and economic 
development.
With one-seventh of the world's arable land and one- 
fifth of the world's population, China is the most populous 
country in the world. With a population exceeding one 
billion, China has interested many demographers both
inside and outside of China. The information available
from China's 1982 census and the 1/1000 Fertility Survey, 
also held in 1982, has provided a forceful stimulus to some 
foreign demographers to do intensive research and study of 
China's population dynamics (Aird, 1982; Chen and Kols, 
1982; Birdsall et al, 1982; Tien, 1983, 1984; Kaufman, 1983;
Coale, 1984; Coale and Chen, 1987; Lavely, 1984, 1986; 
Bongaarts and Greenhalgh, 1985; Wolf, 1986; Greenhalgh,
1986; Feeney and Yu, 
1987).
1987; Martin and Gu, 1987; Banister,
2
Along with the progress of China's economic reform 
program and implementation of the "open door policy" of the 
Chinese government since 1978, China’s economic development 
has also become a popular subject for many foreign 
economists. In this field, there also are plenty of 
publications (Howe, 1978; Dernberger ed., 1980; Rozman ed., 
1981; World Bank, 1983a, 1985a; Kraus, 1982; Cheng, 1982; 
Parish ed. , 1985; Leeming, 1985; Perkins 1987; Perkins and 
Yusuf: 1984) .
Comparing the studies of China’s population and the 
studies of China's economy, only a little work has been done 
in studying interrelationships between population growth and 
economic development in China (Dernberger, 1981; Tian, 1982; 
Chen and Zhang, 1986; Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987). In 
recent years, Tien (1984), Preston and Gu (1985, 1987) and 
Birdsall and Jamison (1983) have done very good studies of 
the effects of China's economic development on fertility. 
But what are the effects of population growth on economic 
development in China? So far, there are only a few 
approaches to the question.
Even so, most Chinese and foreign scholars as well as 
the leaders of the Chinese government believe that China's 
huge population size and. its growth negatively affect 
China's economy. For example, in 1978, the Chinese 
government appointed an expert group headed by Song Jian to 
estimate China’s desirable population size. Based on the 
analysis of food resources, composition of the diet, as well 
as from the perspective of ecological balance and fresh 
water resources, they reached a conclusion that the optimum 
population for China should be between 600 and 700 million 
(Song,1981; Song, Tian, Yu and Li, 1982:10; Song, Tuan and 
Yu, 1985:248). Since China's total population exceeds one 
billion, according to the opinions of the expert group it 
must be a heavy burden for China's macro-economic growth as 
well as economic development. Their studies and conclusions 
have greatly influenced the making of the Chinese 
government's population policy and these actually are the
3theoretical base of China's "one child policy”. This point 
of view was also typically expressed by Chen Muhua, the 
former Director of the Chinese State Family Planning 
Commission (CSFPC):
"In the 25 years between 1953 and 1978, consumer 
income went up by 180 per cent, an increase of no mean 
magnitude. But the population grew by 66.7 per cent.
As a result, per capita consumption gained by only 
one-third. Fifty eight per cent of the annual growth 
in consumption funds had to be diverted to meet the 
needs of the newly added population, leaving only 42 
per cent of increase to improve the living standard of 
the initial base population. Take grain as an example, 
the grain output in 1977 was 565.5 billion catties 
(1 catty = 1/2 kilogram). Compared with the 1951 
grain output of 287.4 billion catties, this represents 
a gain of 95 per cent. However, the per capita 
availability of grain went up to 598 catties from 510 
catties, an increase of only 88 catties, or 17.3
per cent....In our country, with over 900 million
persons, even a small rise in each individual’s demand 
will produce a startingly large aggregate figure, 
exerting great pressure on (for instance) the textile 
industry (when considering the question of clothing of 
people). The current market tension reflects not only 
insufficient output but also population pressure”
(Chen Muhua, 1979, cited by Tien, 1984).
Is the belief true or not? If it is true, how strong is 
the adverse influence? This thesis attempts a preliminary 
estimate of the influence, analyzing historical and 
retrospective data.
1.2 A Brief Literature Review
The impact of population growth on economic development 
has been a subject of debate for a long time. Some 
economists and demographers argue that population growth has
4an adverse impact on economic development, while others 
claim that population growth either aids development or has 
no significant impact on development. For example, Coale 
and Hoover (1958) insist that population growth affects 
economic development adversely by reducing aggregate savings 
and investment and by diverting investment from direct 
growth expenditures to less productive ’’welfare” 
expenditure. McNicoll (1984:212) also noted: ’’the rapid 
population growth is a serious burden on efforts to generate 
sustained increase in per capita product”.
On the other side, some economists such as Keynes 
(1937), Hansen (1939), Simon (1977, 1981, 1986), Clark
(1978) and Boserup (1981) believe that population growth may 
be a stimulus or even have positive effects on economic 
development.
Another group of demographers including Cassen (1976) 
and Preston (1982) argue that population growth has little 
negative effect on economic development. As Preston 
(1982:175) noted:
’’Population growth is not so overwhelmingly 
negative a factor for economic advance as to swamp the 
impact of all other influences. That is a worthwhile 
lesson that bears repeating but it is no argument for 
faster demographic growth”.
There are also other arguments that there are some 
intricate interlinking mechanisms between population growth 
and economic development (Kuznets, 1966, 1974, 1975; Jones, 
1982; Merrick et al, 1986) and that the demographic effects 
on economic development can vary widely across countries 
[Wheeler, 1984]. The report of the Secretary-General of the 
World Population Conference, Bucharest 1974, gave a good 
summary of such points of view:
”It may well be that, in comparison with other 
factors and determinants of economic growth the 
effects of population growth are not so predominant as 
to manifest themselves clearly in different circums-
5tances. This does not imply that population growth is 
not important but that its relations to economic 
growth are parts of a complex of interaction of inter- 
actors, and that under different configurations of 
factors and conditions the demographic impact on 
economic factors may vary” (UN, 1975, Vol.l:54).
The points of view of the last group look more accurate 
and more reasonable. This is because under different 
configurations of economic systems and social institutions, 
in different countries and different stages of socio­
economic development, the impact of population growth on 
economic development can vary widely. For instance, in 
developed countries and in mature economies, population 
growth may have a positive impact on economic growth by 
stimulating ’’effective demand”, as Keynes (1937) and Hansen 
(1939) noted. But in developing countries, especially in
those where land and resources are scarce, population growth 
does have some negative impacts on economic development.
China is a developing country as well as an arable- 
land-scarce country. Maybe this is why nearly all Chinese 
and foreign economists and demographers believe that China’s 
huge population size is a serious burden for the efforts of 
China's economic development.
1.3 Methodological Approaches to the Interrelationships 
between Population Growth and Economic 
Development in China
China is a developing country in the late stages of 
demographic transition, with a crude rate of natural 
increase lower than 1.5 per cent since the 1980s. How has 
China reduced its fertility in a short time? Why can only 
China implement a "one child policy"? There are many 
answers to these questions, but an underlying cause of 
China's demographic transition is China's unique economic, 
political and social institutions. Studies of contemporary 
China's population dynamics, China's economy, the
interrelationships between population trends and economic
6development should be done in view of the particular 
circumstance of socio-economic institutions, historical 
tradition and national culture in Chinese society.
Reviewing the contemporary history of the People's 
Republic of China, it can be seen that there are three 
variables, the socio-economic systems, population dynamics 
and economic development, that are inextricably interwoven. 
The basic framework of the interactions of the three 
variables is as follows:
development
Economic
Socio-economic
systems
Population size
and growth
In different periods, the directions of the 
interactions among the three variables varied. For example, 
from 1949 to 1957 in Chinese society, the variation of the 
basic framework was as follows:
backwardness
Economic
Population size
and its growth
Other
in the Chinese
society
f actorsAdoption of Marxist- 
Leninist doctrine 
Learning from USSR.
Formation
centralized
economic system
planning
The explanation of the above framework is that, during 
the 1950s, both China’s population size of more than five 
hundred millions and its economic backwardness were 
important contributors to the formation of the centralized 
planning economic system. Of course, when studying the 
formation of China’s highly centrally planned economic 
system, it cannot be forgotten that the acceptance of the
7Marxist-Leninist doctrine and adoption of the socio-economic 
systems in the Soviet Union as a model were the most 
important causes. Other factors include the structure of 
social classes in China and Chinese historical 
centralization as well as Chinese traditional culture.
Once China’s centrally planned economic system had been 
structured, the main direction of the lines of force among 
the three variables changed. During 1958 and 1962, the 
framework changed to become:
depression
Economic
calamities
Natural
Trough of popu­
lation growth
Utopian communist 
economic system
Deterioration of
trade relation
Sino-Soviet
The facts of the above simulation framework can be 
described as follows: the fantasy of the communist economic 
system (called the ’’communist wind" in Chinese literature at 
present) during the Great Leap Forward, combining with the 
natural calamities from 1959 to 1961 and the recall of 
Soviet experts and the repayment of Soviet Union loans, 
resulted in China’s economic depression and the great famine 
during 1959 and 1962. The great famine brought about an 
abrupt increase in mortality and a sudden drop in fertility. 
As a result, the population growth rate was negative in 
1960.
From 1962 to 1972, as will be shown in Chapter Two, 
the mechanism of the simulation framework reversed, as 
shown:
Economic recovery 
and growth
>
Rapid population 
growth
8During this period, China’s economy recovered and 
underwent rapid but fluctuating growth. The Chinese 
people's living standards improved after the great famine as 
well as during the period of the three years of adjustment. 
This was accompanied by an improvement in health 
conditions and medical and health systems. As a result, the 
crude death rate (CDR) in China declined from 10 per 
thousand in 1963 to 7.6 per thousand in 1972 (Population 
Research Center, CASS, 1985). On the other hand, although 
the Chinese government leaders had realized the adverse 
influence of the huge population and its rapid growth and 
had made several efforts to implement the family planning 
program, due to China's egalitarian distribution system, the 
fertility rate was very high during this period. These 
factors resulted in the second period of rapid population 
growth of the PRC.
From 1973 to 1978, the framework became very simple. 
Although economic development may have had some impact on 
population trends, the impact was so little that it can be 
ignored. But during this period, China’s highly centralized 
socio-economic system developed strong policies which had a 
great impact on the population processes. The framework can 
be simulated as follows:
policies generated by "Induced"
a highly centralized ---------- > fertility
socio-economic system transition
Since 1978, the interaction has been growing to form a 
mature framework, and the three variables have become 
intricately interacting and inextricably interwoven:
9development
EconomicPopulation control
program
and social reform
At this stage, China's economic reform program. 
China’s population control program and China's economic 
development cannot be isolated from the impact of the other 
two variables. Without consideration of the interplay and 
interweaving of the three variables, it would not be 
possible to get a clear picture and understanding of 
contemporary China.
However, the exposition of the interplay among the 
three variables is quite a task. For this reason this 
thesis will only concentrate on one aspect i.e. macro­
effects of population growth on economic development:
Population growth > Economic development
The other lines of force belong to a future task. But 
even so, we have to bear in mind the basic triangular 
framework in this study. When considering the macro-effects 
of population growth on economic development in China since 
1949, we must not forget the impact of the socio-economic 
system on both sides.
Bearing the triangular framework in mind, Chapter Two 
will give an overview of China's "induced’ demographic 
transition which serves the government’s aims of socio­
economic development; Chapter Three will briefly review 
China’s economic development since 1949 under the pressure 
of huge population size; and finally in Chapter Four, the 
effects of population growth in China since 1949 on macro- 
economic growth as well as on economic development will be 
evaluated.
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CHAPTER TWO: CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
"New births every year in China are equal to 
the total population of Tokyo. If this seldom 
seen problem of population pressure cannot be 
solved, then all splendid economic plans will 
have the empty solace like that of drawing cakes 
to allay hunger”.
--- [Japan] The Yomiuri
(Cited in He, 1987)
Zhongguo (China), as ’’the central kingdom", has been 
recording its population for several thousand years. 
According to earliest historical records, China's population 
in the early period of the Xia dynasty (about 21st to 16th 
centuries BC) was 13.6 million. Two thousand years later, 
by 2 AD in the Han dynasty, it was 59.6 million. This is the 
earliest population count taken in the Chinese empire. 
Afterward, China’s population fluctuated between 37 million 
(705 AD, the Tang dynasty) and 60 million (1393 AD, the Ming 
dynasty) for a thousand years. During the Qing Dynasty, 
Chinese society experienced a period of rapid population 
growth. Early in the Qing dynasty in 1749, China's 
population was recorded as 177.5 million. One century later 
by 1851, it had risen sharply to 431.9 million (Tian, 
1983:33; Durand, 1960). However, due to imperialist 
penetration, armed invasion, civil war ar.d famines, China's 
population increased slowly in the period 1851-1949, 
reaching 541 million at the end of the period (Population 
Research Centre, CASS, 1985:807).
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
(the PRC) in 1949, China’s population experienced a 
tremendous change. In a short time (about two decades), 
China entered a late stage of demographic transition. 
China's demographic transition differs from that of European
11
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and other developed countries, because it was induced by 
deliberate government interventions and efforts in order to 
attained the aims of socio-economic development. For this 
reason the terra ’’induced demographic transition” is used in 
this thesis.
As noted above, China remains a highly centralized 
country. In Chinese society, the government has the 
capability to control social life and people’s behaviour. 
In such a society, the demographic view and intention of 
central government's leaders is a key factor deciding the 
population process. Reviewing the contemporary history of 
the PRC, it can be seen that the problem of population 
pressure is always inextricably interwoven with the efforts 
of the government to accelerate the speed of economic
growth. Since the beginning of the PRC, the communist
government’s ambition of industrialization and modernization 
has always been under the shadow of the problem of feeding 
such a population. With changing understanding of the 
potential impact of the huge population on economic
development in different periods, the Chinese government 
carried out different population policies. In less than two 
decades, China's birth control policy had travelled more 
than a cycle: initial rejection, half-hearted acceptance, 
full acceptance, abandonment, re-acceptance <P. Chen, 
1966 :-5) , and finally intensification. Along with changes in 
the Chinese government leaders’ demographic viewpoints and 
in population policies, the trend of China’s population 
growth in the last 40 years fluctuated greatly (see Figure 
2.1). According to the variation of population policies of 
the Chinese government and fluctuation of the crude rate of 
natural increase of China's population, the demographic 
history of China can be divided into six periods: the first
period (1949-1952): high fertility and high mortality; the
second period (1953-1957): high fertility and declining
mortality; the third period (1958-1961): the trough in 
China’s population growth; the fourth period (1962-1972): 
high fertility and declining mortality; the fifth period 
(1973-1978): rapidly declining fertility and low mortality;
13
Table 2.1 Population dynamics: China, 1949-1987
Year-end CBR CDR CRN I TFR IMR LifeYear population (per (per (per (per (per expec-(million) 1000) 1000) 1000) woman) 1000) tancy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1949 541.7 36.0 20.0 16.0 6.14 |1950 552.0 37.0 18.0 19.0 5.81 — _1951 563.0 37.8 17.8 20.0 5.7 —1952 574.8 37.0 17.0 20.0 6.42 — _1953 537.0 37.0 14.0 23.0 6.05 174.6 40.31954 602.7 37.97 13.18 24.79 6.28 164.3 42.41955 614.7 32.6 12.28 20.32 6.26 153.3 44.61956 628.3 31.9 11.4 20.5 5.85 143.2 47.01957 646.5 34.03 10.8 23.23 6.41 132.4 49.51958 659.9 29.22 11.98 17.24 5.68 146.3 45.81959 672.1 24.73 14.59 10.19 4.3 159.9 42.51960 662.1 20.86 25.43 -4.57 4.02 284.0 24.61961 658.6 18.02 14.24 3.78 3.29 183.4 33.41962 673.0 37.01 10.02 26.99 6.02 88.5 53.01963 691.7 43.37 10.04 33.33 7.5 87.1 54.91964 705.0 39.14 11.5 27.64 6.18 85.6 57.11965 725.4 37.88 9.5 28.38 6.08 84.4 57.81966 745.4 35.05 8.83 26.22 6.26 83.2 58.61967 763.7 33.96 8.43 25.53 5.31 82.0 59.41968 785.3 35.59 8.21 27.38 6.45 80.7 60.31969 806.7 34.11 8.03 26.08 5.72 75.6 60.31970 828.9 33.43 7.6 25.83 5.81 70.4 61.41971 852.3 30.65 7.32 23.33 5.44 65.2 62.01972 871.8 29.77 7.61 22.16 4.98 59.9 62.61973 392.1 27.98 7.04 20.89 4.54 56.2 63.01974 903.6 24.82 7.34 17.48 4.17 52.4 63.4
1975 924.2 23.01 7.32 15.69 3.57 48.6 63.81976 937.2 19.91 7.25 12.66 3.24 44.9 64.21977 949.7 18.93 6.83 12.06 2.84 4i . 0 64.31978 962.6 18.25 6.25 12.0 2.72 37.2 65.11979 975.4 17.28 6.21 11.61 2.75 39.4 65.01980 987.1 18.21 6.34 11.87 2.24 41.6 64.91981 1000.7 20.91 6.36 14.55 2.63 43.7 64.8
1982 1015.4 21.09 6.6 14.49 2.66* 45.7 64.7
1983 1025.0 18.62 7.08 11.54 - 48.0 64.61984 1034.8 17.5 6.69 10.81 2.19* 50.1 64.6
1985 1046.4 17.8 6.57 11.23 - 50.0# 64.0#
1986 1060.1 20.77 6.69 14.08 - 61.0# 66.0#1987 1080.0 21.04 6.65 14.39 to * 44.0# 66.0#
5 — —  — —  —  ST —  — :  =  zz ~  ^  =  —  zz zz zz ~  ~  zz zz ~~z: szr: =  —  i:“ r:zz:si:z:z:zi:ss:z:i:~rz:zsx =  zrr:s:r:s:s*s:r:s:r:zr:
Sources: 1), Columns 1-4 from Population Research Center, CASS (1985);
and from CSSB (1988).
2) , Column 5 from Chen Shengli (1984:56-67).
3) , Columns 2, 3 from Banister (1987, Table 4.18).
4) , * from Coale (1984, Table 5).
5) , ** from Lin Qinggong (1938).
6) , # from Population Reference Bureau (1986, 1987, 1938).
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and finally, the sixth period (1979-): low fertility and low 
mortality.
2.1 The First Period (1949-1952): High Fertility 
and High Mortality
At the initial stage, China's population showed 
characteristic high fertility and high mortality. In 1949, 
the crude birth rate was 36 per thousand, and the crude 
death rate was 20 per thousand, with a crude rate of natural 
increase of 16 per thousand. During 1950 and 1952, the 
crude birth rate stayed at 37 per thousand, but the crude 
death rate began to decline. It was 18 per thousand in 
1950, 17.8 in 1951 and 17 in 1952. According to Coale's 
(1984) estimate, the total fertility rate of Chinese women 
during the period was about six births per woman.
During the initial stage, the Chinese government had no 
explicit population policy. One event, however, influenced 
the Chinese government leaders’ attitude towards China's 
huge population size for more than one decade. In August 
1949, the United States government released a document, 
entitled "United States Relations with China: With Special 
Reference to the Period 1944-1949". Accompanying this 
document was a letter of Dean Acheson, the then Secretary 
of State. Toward the end of the letter, Acheson (1949:4-5) 
proposed there were two factors that had played a major role 
in shaping the destiny of modern China, one being the impact 
of Western ideas and the other being population:
" The population of China during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries doubled, thereby creating an 
unbearable pressure upon the land. The first problem 
which the Chinese government has had to face is that of 
feeding this population. So far none has succeeded...
A large part of the Chinese communist propaganda 
consists of promises that they will solve the land 
problem”.
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To answer this letter, Mao Zedong, the former Chairman 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on September 17, 1949, 
published an unsigned article in People’s Daily. In it Mao 
dismissed Acheson's diagnosis about China’s revolution and 
future. Mao (1964:1515) noted:
”It is a very good thing that China has a large 
population. Even if China's population multiplies many 
times, she is fully capable of finding a solution: the 
solution is production... revolution plus production 
can solve the problem of feeding the population”.
During the 1950s, the view of the supreme leader of the 
government was very influential in making government's 
policy. So during this period, the Chinese government did 
not treat the huge population as a problem of socio-economic 
development and thus ignored the problem of population 
control. In addition, Mao’s statement discouraged academic 
discussion of China’s population problem, especially the 
view that the population had a negative impact on economic 
development.
2.2 The Second Period (1953-1957): High Fertility 
and Declining Mortality
In 1953, China started its First Five-Year Plan. In the 
same year, China conducted its first census which revealed 
that the population had exceeded 580 million and there 
followed a realization that unemployment was rising. 
During this period, some Chinese economists, sociologists 
and demographers proposed that China should adopt a birth 
control policy (Shao Lizhi, 1954,1957; Ma Yinchu, 1957;
Shung, 1957; Chen Changhong, 1957; Chen Da, 1957; Wu 
Jingchao, 1957). The Chinese government also held several 
meetings to discuss China’s birth control program. But 
because of divergent opinions on the population problem 
amongst the leaders of the central government, and because 
China's supreme leader Mao Zedong did not realized the 
gravity of China's huge population size, the Chinese
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government did not implement an effective birth control 
program. During this period, China’s fertility was very 
high with a crude birth rate of more than 32 per thousand 
per annum. According to Coale's estimate, during this 
period, the total fertility rate of Chinese women exceeded 
six births per woman (Coale, 1984:Table 5). At the same 
time, mortality declined. The crude death rate dropped 
from 17 per thousand in 1952 to 10.8 per thousand in 1957. 
As a result, China's population increased very quickly from 
1953 to 1957. In this period, the average crude rate of 
natural increase amounted to 23.5 per thousand per annum. 
This is the first period of rapid population growth of the 
PRC.
2.3 The Third Period(1958-1961): the Great Famine 
and the Trough in China's Population Growth.
By 1957, the Chinese government began to realize the 
problems of scarcity of arable land and unemployment. For 
example, in April 1957, Tan Zhenlin, the Head of the 
Agriculture and Forestry Office of the CCP, bluntly admitted 
that a plenitude of people and scarcity of arable land was 
partly responsible for the low agricultural productivity and 
rural poverty. He noted:
In our country, one of the basic difficulties is 
that there are too many people and too little arable 
land.... Although between 1953 and 1956, we had 
reclaimed 14,000,000 mu (1 hectare = 15 mu) of 
wasteland, per capita arable land has dropped from 
2.8 mu in 1955 because of the population increase"
(Tan,1957; cited by P. Chen, 1967:162).
In May, 1957, Bo Yibo, the Chairman of the State 
Economic Planning Commission also admitted that labour 
employment had been one of the most serious problems 
confronting China. For instance, when talking about the 
problem that the output of industrial crops was not enough
to enable light industrial enterprises to run at full 
capacity during the mid 1950s, Bo noted :
17
’’The major reasons... are that population of our 
country has increased rapidly, that land has increased 
to a limited extent, that increase in grain output 
cannot even meet the increasing demand for consumption” 
(Bo,1957; cited by P. Chen, 1967:165).
Facing the above facts, the Chinese government in 1957 
began its first campaign of birth control. By 1958, all 
publicity encouraged voluntary birth limitations. But the 
campaign was broken off by the Great Leap Forward and by 
criticism of Ma Yinchu, a famous Chinese economist who 
insisted that China should adopt a birth control policy. In 
1958, the crude rate of natural increase in China was still 
17 per thousand. Natural disasters followed by an unusually 
bad harvest, and implementation of Utopian communist 
economic policy and the abrupt cessation of Soviet aid to 
China led to a food crisis and a period of semi-starvation 
and economic difficulty. As a result, the mortality during 
this time went up sharply. The crude death rate was 12 per 
thousand in 1958, 14.6 in 1959, 25.4 in 1960 and 14.2 in
1961. According to Banister’s (1987) estimate, the life 
expectancy for both males and females in China was only 24.6 
in 1960 (see Table 1.1). On the other hand, due to the food 
crisis, fertility declined. The crude birth rate was
24.78 per thousand in 1959, 20.86 in 1960 and 18.02 in
1961. The dual motion of mortality increase and fertility 
decline resulted in a trough in China’s population growth.
2.4 The Fourth Period (1962-1972): High Fertility 
and Declining Mortality; the Largest Baby Boom.
At the ’’Chengdu (the capital of Shichuan province) 
Conference" attended by party and government leaders held in 
March, 1958, Mao Zedong said:
"It is also not right to propagandize that there
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are too many people thus resulting in a pessimistic 
atmosphere. It should been seen that more people is a 
good thing. In fact, when (China’s) population reaches 
700 to 800 million then control should be implemented" 
[cited by Ding Shu, 1988:111].
Mao's recommendation unfortunately came to pass. The 
Chinese government only implemented its effective birth 
control program ten years after Mao’s statement, by which 
time China's population exceeded 800 million.
The economic morass of the Great Leap Forward and food 
shortage during the great famine from 1959 to 1961 made the 
Chinese government leaders aware of the serious burden of 
China's huge population, and motivated the gradual 
resumption of its family planning program after 1962. 
During the period, the government made several efforts to 
control population growth. For example, during the 1960s, 
it is estimated that 2-3 million women used induced abortion 
as birth control, and by the end of 1965, an estimated 14-15 
million women in the childbearing age (10-11 per cent) used 
contraception (Kaufman, 1983:25-26). But because the 
government had not employed any coercive birth control 
measures, and in addition, because the extensive social 
disruption caused by the Great Cultural Revolution
influenced birth control efforts, China's fertility was high 
during the period, with the crude birth rate reaching its 
peak of 43.4 per thousand in 1963. In most of the eleven 
years it was over 34 per thousand. As a result, during the 
eleven years, nearly 300 million babies were born, and the 
population increased by 213 million. This growth resulted 
in a population momentum which will affect China's
population dynamics for several decades.
2.5 The Fifth Period(1973-1978): Rapidly Declining
Fertility and Low Mortality; ”Induced” 
Demographic Transition
Although the family planning message permeated every 
aspect of the society and became an integral part of the
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Socialist Education Movement undertaken in the mid 1960s, 
China’s rapid population growth did not slow until the early 
1970s. In order to solve the problem of feeding the 
population of more than 800 million, the Chinese leaders 
decided to grasp ’’two kinds of production": on one hand, to
grasp the material production to rehabilitate the national 
economy from the Great Cultural Revolution; on the other 
hand, to grasp population "production” (reproduction) to 
reduce the population growth rate. In 1971, the family 
planning program of "wan, xi, shao” (later, longer and 
fewer), that is, later marriage and childbearing, longer 
spacing between births and fewer children, was launched. In 
1974, Mao Zedong once more emphasized: "population growth 
must be controlled" [see Hu Wenruo, 1981:66]. The "supreme 
instruction" had a strongly positive effect on the promotion 
of family planning. The birth control program was at last 
given full attention. A sign of the intensification of the 
birth control program was that the government’s financial 
support for family planning was increased. According to 
Banister’s estimate, in 1977 the government spent about 70- 
85 million Yuan (equivalent to about 45-55 million US$) on 
its birth control program. Banister added:
"The sum probably underestimates the costs of 
contraceptive research, development, production and 
distribution plus full costs of birth control 
operations", and that "This total also does not include 
all the costs of salaries and work-point payments to 
family planning personal, motivational and publicity 
work, training family planning workers, and paying 
recipients of birth control operations" (Banister,
1987:167) .
Due to the intensified implementation of the family 
planning program, fertility in China declined rapidly. The 
crude birth rate declined from 29.8 per thousand in 1972 to 
18.3 per thousand in 1978. Along with the decline of 
fertility, the crude rate of natural increase went down from 
22.16 per thousand in 1972 to 12.5 in 1978. According to
20
Coale’s (1984) estimate, the total fertility rate of Chinese 
women dropped from 5.08 in 1972 to 2.78 in 1978. Since the 
middle 1970s, China has reached the late stages of 
demographic transition.
2.6 The Sixth Period (1979-): Low Fertility and Low 
Mortality; Difficulties and Problems
At the very end of the Great Cultural Revolution, the 
Chinese government launched its ambitious campaign of 
economic development and advertised the Four Modernizations, 
that is the Modernizations of Agriculture, Industry, 
National Defence, and Science and Technology. In order to 
achieve the aim, in June, 1979, Hua Guofeng, the former 
Chairman of the CCP after Mao and the former Premier of the 
Chinese State Council after Zhou Enlai, delivered his work 
report to the Fifth National Congress. He reaffirmed the 
national goal of decreasing population growth to a rate of 
10 per thousand by 1980 and set a further goal of 5 per 
thousand by 1985. Adopting the projections of the expert 
group headed by Song Jian (noted above) based on assumed 
relations between macro-demographic and macro-economic 
growth, the government further intensified its already quite 
strong birth control program by implementing the "one child 
policy”.
Although the Chinese government has done its best to 
implement the policy, the birth control program seems to 
have reached its limit in the current circumstance of 
China’s socio-economic development. The crude birth rate 
has fluctuated between 17.5 per thousand (1984) and 21.1 per 
thousand (1982). The total fertility rate was also 
estimated to fluctuate between 2.3 and 2.7 per woman. The 
goal of reducing the growth rate of the population to 5 per 
thousand has not been reached.
On the contrary, along with the deepening of China's 
economic reform, the decentralization of political 
administration and introduction of market-oriented 
mechanisms in economic systems, the implementation of the 
"one child policy” has met some obstacles. In particular,
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the introduction of the contract responsibility systems in 
the countryside since 1981 has led to difficulties of 
implementing the "one child policy" in rural areas, because 
the change has disrupted the system of rewards to one child 
couples and penalties to couples with more than one child. 
Since 1984 fertility in China has shown a rising trend. For 
example, the crude birth rate was 17.8 per thousand in 1985, 
20.77 in 1986 and 21.04 in 1987. According to the figures 
released by the CSFPC, in 1987, about 22.58 million babies 
were born. Of these only 51.7 per cent were first births 
and 31.5 per cent second births. The figures also showed 
that births beyond the planning quota accounted for 29 per 
cent of total births (Renmin Ribao. 1938, May 14th:3).
(
CHAPTER THREE: CHINA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1949
"...the really substantive barriers to 
development are non-economic..."
---  Buchanan and Ellis
(Cited in Leibenstein, 1967:30)
In the past, China has been a typical agricultural 
society. As note above, during the Qing dynasty, Chinese 
society experienced a period of rapid population growth. 
From 1741 to 1850, China's population maintained an average 
growth rate of 17.3 per thousand per annum (Li Debin, 
1987:34). At the same time, Western Europe also had a 
period of rapid population growth, but this coincided with 
industrialization and growth of the capitalist economy. Thus 
population growth in European countries during this period 
contributed to economic development (Kuznets 1966; Simon, 
1976). In contrast, China's population growth during the 
Qing dynasty occurred in a feudal society where the 
agricultural technology had not significantly changed. 
Therefore, the impact of population growth on the economy at 
this time in China was different from that in European 
societies.
From 1850 to 1949, due to imperialist penetration, 
armed innovation, civil war and natural calamity, China’s 
economy suffered serious reverses. In 1949, the PRC showed 
all the characteristics of a backward and underdeveloped 
economy with low productivity, a low level of production and 
a low level of per capita income (see Table 3.1):
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Table 3.1 Economic indicators for China and selected
other countries
China USA USSR JAPAN Britain India
1949
National income 
(billion US$) 11.8 265.8 61.1 16.2 34.6 NA
per capita(US$) 21.0 1746 339 189 687 NA
Steel per capita(kg) 0.3 472 132 NA 314 4.9
Grain per capita(kg) 209 1050 498 NA NA 149
1937/8
Railway(km/10000km) 21.9 410.1 37.9 484.7 1257 NA
Sources: Rows 1, 2 from Li Songlin (1986:221); rows 3, 4, 5 
from Li Debin (1987:35 & 26).
Since 1949, China's economy has grown at a relatively 
high rate. According to the CSSB figure, China’s economy 
(TPS, that is the Total Products of Society) maintained an 
average growth rate of 8.4 per cent per annum (see Table 
3.2). TPS in 1985 was 15 times greater than in 1949; GOVA, 
that is the Gross Output Value of Agriculture, 4.5 times; 
and GOVI, that is the Gross Output Value of Industry, 31.7 
times (Department of National Economic Balance, CSSB; 1987). 
During these years, due to political movements, China's 
economy experienced two fluctuations. One happened in the 
Great Leap Forward; another happened during the Great 
Cultural Revolution.
Reviewing the contemporary history of China, it can 
been seen that the economy is determined by socio-economic 
systems and political campaigns. China’s huge and growing 
population also has had some impact on economic development. 
Most Chinese scholars agree that the contemporary history of 
China's economy can be divided into six periods: the first 
period (1949-1952), recovery of the economy; the second 
period (1953-1957), rapid growth; the third period (1958- 
1962), the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine; the 
fourth period (1963-1965), adjustment, recovery and growth; 
the fifth period ( 1966-1976), growth and fluctuation; and 
finally, the sixth period (1977-), steady growth and 
economic reform.
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Table 3.2 Econoaic growth: China. 1949-1985
GNP (based on Chinese GNP per capita TPS (Total Product of Y (National Incote)
govemaent's estiaate) Society)
Year
(Billion Annual Index (1979 Annual Index (Billion Annual Index (Billion Annual Index
1979 growth 1952=100 growth 1952=100 growth 1952=100 growth 1952=100
US$) X X U S S ) X X Yuan) X X Yuan) X X
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1949 30.9 59.5 57.0 63.1 55.7 35.8
1950 37.7 22.0 72.6 68.3 19.8 75.6 68.3 42.6
1951 40.0 16.7 77.0 78.2 14.5 86.6 82.0 49.7
1952 51.9 17.9 100.0 90.3 15.5 100.0 101.5 25.9 100.0 58.9 22.3 100.0
1953 55.1 6.1 106.2 93.7 3.8 103.8 124.1 18.7 118.7 70.9 14.0 114.0
1954 57.7 4.8 111.2 95.9 2.3 106.2 134.6 8.5 128.8 74.8 5.8 120.6
1955 63.0 9.1 121.4 102.5 6.9 113.5 141.5 6.1 136.6 78.8 6.4 128.3
1956 68.2 8.3 131.4 108.6 6.0 120.3 163.9 17.9 161.1 88.2 14.1 146.4
1957 72.4 6.2 139.5 112.0 3.1 124.0 160.6 6.1 170.9 90.8 4.5 153.0
1958 86.0 18.8 165.7 130.6 16.6 144.6 213.8 32.6 226.7 111.8 22.0 186.7
1959 81.8 -4.9 157.6 121.9 -6.7 135.0 254.8 18.0 267.4 122.2 8.2 202.1
1960 79.7 -2.6 154.6 116.6 -4.2 129.1 267.9 4.7 280.0 122.0 -1.4 199.2
1961 62.9 -21.1 121.2 90.9 -22.0 100.7 197.8 -33.5 186.2 99.6 -29.7 140.0
1962 68.7 9.2 132.4 98.1 7.9 108.6 180.0 -10.0 167.6 92.4 -6.5 130.9
1963 77.6 13.0 149.5 109.5 11.6 121.3 195.6 10.2 184.7 100.0 10.7 144.9
1964 86.0 10.8 165.7 120.0 9.6 132.9 226.8 17.5 217.0 116.6 16.5 168.8
1965 97.0 12.8 186.9 133.7 11.4 148.1 269.5 19.0 258.2 138.7 17.0 197.5
1966 110.1 13.5 * 212.1 147.9 10.5 163.8 306.2 16.9 301.8 158.6 17.0 231.0
1967 105.9 -3.8 204.0 138.7 -6.2 153.6 277.4 -9.9 272.0 148.7 -7.2 214.3
1968 107.0 1.0 206.2 136.5 -1.6 151.2 264.8 -4.7 259.2 141.5 -6.5 200.4
1969 118.6 10.8 228.5 147.5 8.1 163.3 318.4 25.3 324.8 161.7 19.3 239.1
1970 138.0 16.4 265.9 167.2 13.4 185.2 380.0 24.2 403.1 192.6 23.3 294.7
1971 147.4 6.8 283.0 174.8 4.5 193.6 420.3 10.4 445.2 '207.7 7.0 315.3
1972 154.2 4.6 297.1 178.9 2.3 198.1 439.6 4.5 465.0 213.6 2.9 324.5
1973 174.1 12.9 335.5 197.7 10.5 218.9 477.6 8.6 505.0 231.8 8.3 351.4
1974 •■ 180.4 3.6 347.6 200.5 1.4 222.0 485.9 1.9 514.6 234.8 1.1 355.2
1975 193.0 7.0 371.9 209.9 4.7 232.4 537.9 11.5 573.8 250.3 8.3 384.7
1976 193.0 0 371.9 207.0 -1.4 229.2 543.3 1.4 581.8 242.7 -2.7 374.4
1977 208.8 8.2 402.3 220.9 6.7 244.6 600.3 10.3 641.7 $>4.4 7.8 403.6
1978 233.0 11.6 443.9 243.2 10.1 269.3 684.6 13.1 725.8 301.0 12.3 453.2
1979 245.6 5.4 473.2 253.0 4.0 280.2 764.2 3.5 787.5 335.0 7.0 484.9
1980 262.3 6.8 507.1 267.6 5.8 296.3 853.1 8.4 853.7 368.8 6.4 515.9
1981 270.2 3.0 520.2 271.2 1.3 300.3 907.1 4.6 893.0 394.0 4.9 541.2
1982 - - - - - 996.3 9.5 977.8 426.1 8.3 586.1
1983 - • - - - - 1112.5 10.3 1078.5 473.0 9.8 643.5
1984 - - - - - 1316.7 14.7 1237.0 565.0 13.5 730.4
1985 324.4* - 625* 310* - 343.3 1658.7 17.2 1449.8 700.7 12.7 823.2
1953-57 6.9 4.4 724.7 11.3 403.5 8.9
1953-62 -1.0 -2.6 1114.3 -0.4 548.0 -3.1
1963-65 12.2 10.9 691.9 15.5 355.3 14.7
1966-70 7.3 4.6 1546.8 9.3 803.1 8.3
1971-75 6.9 4.7 2361.3 7.3 1138.2 5.5
1976-80 6.3 5.0 3445.5 3.8 1511.9 6.0
1981-85 4.3 3.0 5991.3 11.2 2558.8 9.8
1953-85 5.5 3.7 8.4 6.6
Note; Coluans 7 and 10 are at current prices; other coluans are at constant prices.
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3.1 The First: Period (1949-1952): Recovery 
of China *s Economy
In the initial stages of China’s economic development 
after the Chinese communists came to the power, the main 
tasks were confiscating bureaucrat capital, bringing the 
land reform to the major parts of the country and 
stabilizing commodity prices. After confiscating the 
bureaucrat capital, the state owned economy was developed. 
The agrarian reform in 1950 resulted in confiscation and 
distribution of landlord property, thus the state of "land 
to the tiller" was reached. By 1952, the Chinese government 
had stabilized and rehabilitated the national economy, and 
considerable progress had been made. According to Asbrook’s 
estimates of the U.S. Congress, annual average growth of 
GNP in the year 1950 to 1952 was 19.3 per cent, 34 per cent 
for industrial production and 16 per cent for agricultural 
production (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Development of GNP, industrial and 
agricultural production, 1949 -1952
GNP(billion Annual % Annual 7„ Annual %
Year US$ value change in change in change in
1977) GNP industry agriculture
1949 54.37 — — —
1950 66.83 22.9 37.5 14.6
1951 77.83 16.5 36.8 17.6
1952 92.34 18.6 27.9 16.3
Average 1950-1952 19.3 34.0 16.2
Source: Asbrook (1978:204).
During the three year period of economic recovery, the 
population problem did not come under government 
consideration. But the impact of the huge population size 
on economic development was already evident. For example, 
even though the total output of grain rose from 150 million 
tons in 1949 to 163.92 million tons in 1952, and the total 
output of cotton rose from 0.84 million tons in 1949 to 1.70 
million tons in 1952, grain per capita in 1952 was only 285
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kilograms and cotton per capita only 2.27 kilogram (CSSB, 
1981; Li Debin, 1987:103-105). These figures show that China 
had not solved the problem of feeding the population.
3.2 The Second Period (1953-1957): Formation of the 
Centrally Planned Economic System and 
Rapid Growth of the Economy
With the short term problems posed by the war-ravaged 
economy before 1949 more or less overcome during the three 
year recovery period, the new Republic had to consider long 
term questions of how the economy should develop. Two major 
questions awaited answers. The first concerned
industrialization: what rate of economic growth should be 
pursued? what development strategy should be adopted? The 
second centred on the socialization of the economy. For 
both issues, demographic factors had a latent influence on 
the decisions of the Chinese government.
In 1953, the Chinese government announced the
commencement of the First Five-Year Plan. During the First 
Five-Year Plan period, the industrialization policy of the 
Chinese government accelerated the build-up of heavy 
industry. Implementation of the development policy
immediately encountered the problem of capital scarcity. 
There were two sorts of capital resources accounted for, 
one coming from savings of national income (called the 
accumulation funds in the Chinese literature). Total
accumulation funds in the national income during the First 
Five-Year Plan period accounted for 99.8 billion Yuan (40.34 
billion US$ using the 1956 exchange rate of Yuan/US$). Of 
the accumulation fund, 59 per cent (about 23.79 billion 
US$) was used as capital investment (see Table 3.4).
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Table 3.4 Savings and capital investment in the 
First Five-Year Plan period
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Total
Savings 
(billion US$) 6.79 7.88 7.48 8.77 9.42 40.34
Savings ratio (%) 23.1 25.5 22.5 24.4 24.9 24.2
Capital Investment 
(billion US$) 3.66 4.00 4.06 6.28 5.79 23.79
Proportion of 
investment in 
savings
Capital
(%) 53.8 50.8 54.2 71.6 61.5 59.0
Note: 1), Savings is that part of the national
income which is used for social expenditure of 
productive and capital stock. The equation is: 
national income = consumption + savings 
2), The figure was calculated by the exchange rate 
of Yuan/US$ of 2.474:1 in 1956.
Sources: 1), Department of the National Economic Balance, 
CSSB (1987:2).
2), CSSB (1983:25, 323).
The second source was aid and loans from the Soviet 
Union. According to Chu-Yan Cheng, the value of the 
industrial equipment delivered by the Soviet Union during 
the first 5-year plan period was 1,170 million US$ and the 
value of ready-for-use installation was 745 million US$ 
(Cheng, 1964:31, 91).
Increases in capital investment, combining with 
increases in employment and productivity, contributed to 
rapid economic growth. TPS maintained a growth rate of 
11.3 per cent per annum during the time (see Table 3.5).
Table 3.5 China's Economic Growth, 1953-1957 (7&)
1957
(1952=100)
Average growth rate 
per annum (1953-1957)
TPS + 70.9 + 11.3
GOVA + 24.8 + 4.5
GOV I +128.6 + 18.0
National income + 53.0 + 8.9
Note.- The figures were calculated at constant prices. 
Source: Li Debin (1987:228).
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The successes achieved during the First Five-Year Plan 
cannot disguise the failures that become more and more 
visible towards the end of the plan period. Low employment 
effects, imbalance between the different economic sectors 
and faulty coordination of production growth, which could 
not keep up with the population growth, all showed the 
limitations of the government’s ambitious development 
policies. As noted above, the employment situation became 
much worse during the period. The employment problem was 
due to the population factor as well as to the one sided-use 
of capital-intensive production methods in industry. As Bo 
Yibo (1957) noted:
"One-sided pursuit of mechanization, automation and 
so forth, failure to take into consideration the 
distinctive characteristic of the existence of larger
manpower in our country-- these had directly affected
the volume of labour employment in our country”
(cited by P.Chen, 1967:163).
Bo also appealed to the government to pay more
attention to medium and small enterprises which had the 
advantage of being capable of utilizing China's abundant 
labour force. From Bo's statement, it can be seen that
during the period, China’s huge and growing population had 
some negative effects on the economy by affecting the 
adoption of labour-intensive technology which can slow down 
the rise of productivity but can increase employment.
At the same time that it was speeding up
industrialisation, China also accomplished its socialization 
of the economy and formation of a centrally planned economic 
system with emphasis on public ownership of means of
production. By 1957, China's centrally planned economic 
system with socialist public ownership had taken shape. Did 
demographic factors play a role in shaping such a unique 
economic system? If they did, how? The impact of 
demographic factors on socio-economic systems is not easy to 
see because it works through complex social mechanisms. But
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China's huge population size did have some impact on shaping 
centralized planning during the plan period. For instance, 
China's unique system of monopoly of purchase and marketing 
of grain and cotton, and the ration system of foodstuffs in 
urban areas was the direct outcome of over-population in the 
1950s. During the 1950s China’s grain and cotton 
production increased remarkably. For example, grain 
output grew by 44.8 per cent between 1952 and 1949, and grew 
a further 25 per cent by 1957. Cotton output grew 193.7 per 
cent between 1952 and 1949, and grew a further 26 per cent 
by 1957 (Li Debin, 1987:105; Liu and Wu, 1984:114). In 
spite of the increases, grain and cotton were often short in 
urban areas. In order to stabilize markets and ensure 
industrial construction, from 1953, the Chinese government 
began to carry out state monopoly purchase and marketing of 
grain and cotton. As a result, the ration system of 
foodstuffs in urban areas took shape, which is a typical 
surviving characteristic of China’s centrally planned 
economic system. The mechanism can be viewed as follows:
Ration
system
Shortage of
grain and
cotton
Huge popula­
tion size
and growth
State monopoly 
purchase and of 
market of grain and cotton
economic system
3.3 The Third Period (1958-1962): the Great 
Leap Forward and the Great Famine
The rapid economic growth during the First Five-Year 
Plan turned the Chinese government leader’s heads. The 
situation of over-population, abundant labour force supply 
and capital scarcity forced the government leaders to search 
for an alternative development strategy. In the course of 
1957, the Chinese government gradually fixed upon an
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alternative development strategy, subsequently called the 
’’Great Leap Forward”. The essence of the strategy was to 
employ a large-scale rural labour forces with little or 
insignificant state investment to engage in capital 
construction.
On June 4, 1957, the Chinese State Council issued a 
directive on "increasing production and practicing economy”, 
in which it was stated:
”We must fully utilize the conditions of abundant 
population and rich natural resources in our country, 
and advocate local mass labour construction and 
operation of small coal mines, small iron furnaces, 
and non-ferrous metal plants” (cited by P. Chen,
1966:180).
At the beginning of 1958, the Great Leap Forward, the 
comprehensive mobilization of the masses, was launched, 
followed by a movement of construction of people’s communes 
in rural areas. In half a year, over 103 million peasants 
were organized into brigades providing thirteen billion work 
days devoted to the construction of irrigation projects (P. 
Chen, 1966:182). In 1958, several tens of millions of 
people went to mountainous areas to excavate coal and iron 
mines and "back-yard” steel furnaces. The total labour 
force making iron and steel was only half a million by July 
1858. But by the end of 1958, the total figure had 
increased to 90 million (Li Debin, 1987:301).
The shift of peasants from field to dam site and to 
"back-yard” steel furnaces, combined with the communist 
distribution system in the people's communes, contributed to 
a sharp decline of grain and cotton output. The serious 
natural calamities (especially drought) from 1959 to 1961 
worsened the situation (see Table 3.6). As a result, the 
"Great Famine” of 1959 to 1961 was the most serious 
inflicted on China in this century (Kraus, 1982:167-167).
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Table 3.6 Economic indicators of the Great Famine
(1958-1962)
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
GOVA (billion Yuan) 55.0 47.5 41.5 40.5 43.0
annual change (%) 2.4 -13.6 -12.6 -2.4 6.2
Grain output(billion kg) 200 170 144 148 160
annual change (%) 2.5 -15.0 -15.5 2.8 8.47
grain per capita (kg) 303 253 217 224 238
Cotton output(billion kg)1.97 1.71 1.06 0.8 0.75
annual change (%) 20.1 -13.1 -37.2 -24.7 -6.3
cotton per capita(kg) 3.0 2.5 1.6 1.2 1.1
Edible oil-bearing
crops(billion kg) 4.77 4.10 1.94 1.81 2.00
annual change (%) - -14.0 -52.7 -0.5 10.5
oil per capita 7.2 6.1 2.9 2.8 3.0
Note: GOVA and the growth rate of GOVA is calculated
at constant price.
Sources.- 1), CSSB: Chinese Statistical Year-Book, 1982.
2), Li Debin (1987:319, 321).
The sharp decline of agricultural output resulted in a 
decline of light industrial output. Compared with 1959, the 
gross output value of light industry dropped by 35 per cent; 
cotton yarn by 64.2 per cent; cotton cloth by 66.6 per cent; 
sugar by 69.1 per cent; and cigarettes by 55.8 per cent in 
1962 (Li Debin, 1978:321). Due to the decline in production 
in agriculture and light industry, the heavy industry and 
iron and steel industry began to decline from 1961. 
Compared with 1960, the gross output value of heavy industry 
dropped by 58.6 per cent; steel output by 66.0 per cent; 
coal output by 44.6 per cent and the output of machine tools 
by 85 per cent (figures derived from CSSB, 1982). The
economic crisis began with falling agricultural output, 
followed by falling light industrial and heavy industrial 
output, and finally a total crisis of the whole national 
economy.
The steep, successive declines of agricultural output 
and light industrial output inevitably brought about the 
worsening of people’s living standards. In rural areas, 
food consumption continuously declined (see Table 3.7).
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Table 3.7 Rural grain consumption per head
(1957-1962) (kg)
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Grain per 
Drop from
capita 
1957(%)
204.5 201
-1.7
184 
-10.0
156 
-23.7
153.5
-24.9
160.5
-21.5
Sources: 1, Li Debin (1987:331).
2, Social Statistical Department, CSSB 
(1985:76).
The urban dwellers’ disposable income and foodstuffs 
also dropped sharply and continuously (see Table 3.8 and 
Table 3.9):
Table 3.8 Average wages of workers and government’s
staff per annum (1957-1962) (US$)
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Real wage 257.4 221.7 208.9 202.3 161.3 164.4
Drop from 1957(%) -13.9 -18.9 -21.4 -37.4 -36.2
= = 2 2 2: =  =  =  = itiiiiiiiiiiitiiiiiiiiiiiiii =  =  =r =  =  =  =  = =  =  =  =  =: =  =  =  =  =  =
Note: l) , The real wage was calculated by subtracting the
price increase after 1957.
2), The figures were calculated at the exchange 
rate of Yuan/US$ of 2.474:1 in 1957.
Sources: 1), Social Statistical Department, CSSB 
(1987:152).
2), Li Debin (1987:327).
Table 3.9 Consumption of foodstuffs per head per annum
in 1952, 1957 and 1962 (kg)(%)
—  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  —  —  —  =  =  —  —  =  =  =  =  —  =  —  = := =: = = := = = = :=: —  = —  — —  —
Decrease Decrease
1952 1957 1962 by 1962 
from 1957
by 1962 
from 1952
Grain
whole country 198 203 165 -18.7 -16.5
urban dwellers 241 196 134 -6.1 -23.4
rural
Edible
dwellers
oil
192 205 161 -21.5 -16.2
whole country 2.1 2.4 1.1 -54.2 -47.6
urban dwellers 5.1 5.2 2.5 -51.9 -51.0
rural dwellers 1.7 1.9 1.3 -31.6 -23.5
Pork
whole country 5.9 5.1 2.2 -56.8 -62.2
urban dwellers 8.9 9.0 3.8 -57.8 -57.3
rural dwellers 5.5 4.4 1.9 -56.8 -65.5
Source: Social Statistical Department, CSSB (1985:76-78).
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The country-wide shortages of foodstuffs brought about 
a serious demographic result. As showed in Appendix Figure 
1 and Table 1.1, fertility dropped and mortality rose 
sharply.' Using the crude death rate in 1957 as a controlled 
rate, it is calculable that there were at least 15 million 
additional deaths due to the great famine from 1959 to 1961. 
Using Banister’s (1987) figure for the estimated mortality 
rate in China during this period, the additional deaths can 
be estimated as 25 million.
3.4 The Fourth Period (1963-1965): Adjustment,
Recovery and Growth
The economic crisis after the Great Leap Forward and 
the serious food shortage during the great famine forced the 
Chinese government to change its development strategy. 
Feeding the population once again became priority for the 
whole country. From 1962 to 1965, the government adopted a 
strategy of speeding up the growth of agriculture and 
slowing down the speed of industry. It stressed feeding 
people and writing off capital investment. From 1961 to July 
1963, about 19 million workers and staff recently recruited 
from the countryside were sent back (Li Debin, 1987:365), 
and about 57,000 construction projects were halted, writing 
off 31.7 billion Yuan (about 12.9 billion US$) of investment 
(Li Debin, 1987:365-367). Heavy industrial output was cut 
in the face of a shortage of coal and a general depletion of 
capital. In national income, the share of the expenditure 
on consumption was raised and the share in investment was 
reduced (see Table 3.10):
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Table 3.10 Consumption and savings in national income
(1952-1965) (billion Yuan)
Available Na­
tional income
Consump­
tion
Savings Savings ratio 
(%)
1952-1957 412.2 312.4 99.8 24.2
1958-1962 561.6 388.4 173.2 30.8
1963-1965 357.8 276.7 81.1 22.7
Source.- Department of National Economic Balance, 
CSSB (1987:2).
The implementation of the policy of adjustment brought
about a rapid recovery of the economy. During the three
year period of adjustment, TPS grew by 15.5 per cent per
annum, GOVA by 11.1 per cent and GOVI by 17.9 per cent.
During the recovery of the economy, the population also 
maintained its highest growth rate (see Table 1.1) during 
the three years. As a result, although the famine no longer 
existed, the living standard of the Chinese people did not 
return to the 1957 level (see Table 3.11):
Table 3.11 Index of the real wage of workers and 
staff of whole country (1963-1965)
=  = =  = = =  =  =  =  = = = = = = = = =  = = = = = = =  = = = = =
1952 1957 1963 1964 1965
Real wage 100 127.9 102.2 108.1 110.1
Source: Social Statistical Department, CSSB 
(1987:151) .
In rural areas, although the country-wide famine 
disappeared, the peasants’ income still did not return to 
the national level in 1957. According to CSSB figures, the 
average income per head per annum of rural residents was 
US$ 21.2 in 1957, US$ 18.7 in 1962 and US$ 21.2 in 1965. 
If the price increases after 1957 are considered, the real 
income of rural residents would be much lower than that in 
1957 .
This fact also can be observed from the real quantity 
of consumption goods (see Table 3.12):
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Table 3.12 Quantity of consumption of foodstuffs
per capita per annum: China, 1957, 1962 and 1965 (kg)
Grain Edible oil Pork Sugar Cloth (m)
1957 203 2.4 5.1 1.5 6.8
1962 165 1. 1 2.2 1.6 3.7
1965 183 1.7 6.3 1.55 6.1
Source: Social Statistical 
(1985:76-78)
Department, CSSB
From Table 3.12, it can be seen that after the three
years of economic recovery, while the quantity of 
consumption of foodstuffs and clothing had increased 
compared with 1962, it was still lower than the level in 
1957. One of major causes of this situation was the rapid 
population growth during the period.
3.5 The Fifth Period (1966-1976): The Great Cultural 
Revolution; Growth and Fluctuation
Just after the reverses suffered by the Chinese economy 
in the crisis years 1958-1962 had been overcome, Chinese 
society entered another turbulent period. Starting in the 
latter half of 1966, the Great Cultural Revolution lasted 
for more than ten years. What was the effect of the Great 
Cultural Revolution on China's economy? On this question, 
there have been many publications both in Chinese and in 
other languages. Reviewing this literature, it appears that 
most Chinese and foreign scholars tend to overstate or 
overestimate the reverse effects of the Great Cultural 
Revolution on the economy. Actually, although the Great 
Cultural Revolution did bring about turbulence in China’s 
political mechanisms, it had less impact on the economic 
systems and thus on economic growth. Despite three 
fluctuations in 1967-1968, 1974 and 1976, China's economy 
maintained a relatively high rate of growth during the 
period of the Great Cultural Revolution. The average growth 
rate of TPS was 9.3 per cent per annum from 1966 to 1970 and 
7.3 per cent from 1971 to 1975. For national income, the
36
average growth rate per annum was 8.35 per cent from 1966 to 
1970 and 5.5 per cent from 1971 to 1975 (see Table 3.2).
During the Great Cultural Revolution, the economic 
development strategy of the Chinese government stressed the 
growth of steel output in industry and the growth of grain 
output in agriculture. The Chinese government also 
followed the strategy of increasing savings, thus 
increasing capital investment at the expense of improvement 
of people's living standards. For example, during these 
ten years, the proportion of savings in national income 
averaged 30.2 per cent (based on Department of National 
Economic Balance, CSSB, 1987). The implementation of the 
development policy, combined with the rapid population 
growth, inevitably resulted in a slowing down in the rate of 
improvement of people's living standards. During the 
period, the wage level of the whole country was at a 
standstill, and even declined (see Table 3.13).
Table 3.13 Wage levels of workers and staff in China 
during the Great Cultural Revolution
Year Average wage per 
annum (Yuan)
Index (1952=100) 
Money wage Real wage
1952 445 100.0 100.0
1957 637 140.2 127.9
1966 583 131.0 110.1
1967 587 131 .9 111 . 7
1968 577 129.7 109.7
1969 575 129.2 108.3
1970 561 126.1 105.6
1971 560 125.8 106.6
1972 588 132.1 110.6
1973 587 131.9 110.3
1974 584 131.2 109.0
1975 580 130.3 107.9
1976 575 129.2 106.7
Source.- Social Statistical Department, CSSB 
(1987:151).
From the Table 3.13, it can be observed that real wages 
of workers and staff in the whole country dropped 11.2 per 
cent between 1957 and 1976 and dropped 5 per cent between 
1966 and 1976.
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In rural areas, the income of peasants also declined. 
According to the Chinese State Planning Commission (CSFPC), 
the per capita real income of peasants in the whole country 
only increased 5.6 per cent at current prices (Liu and Wu, 
1984:108). If price increases during the period are 
considered, the real income of peasants did not increase, 
but declined. Another adverse impact of population growth 
on economic development was insufficient employment. Due to 
the first baby boom in the 1950s, after 1970, about 20 
million young people entered the labour force each year. In 
spite of the Chinese government forcibly relocating about 16 
million educated urban young people from cities and towns to 
the countryside and mountainous areas (Li Debin, 1987:516), 
there were more .than 10 million young people '’waiting for 
jobs" (i.e unemployed) in urban areas by 1976 (Liu and Wu 
1984:102). In rural areas, because the total labour force 
in agriculture had reached 294 million by 1976 from 173 
million in 1952, arable land per unit of labour in 
agriculture dropped from 9 mu (0.6 hectare) to 5 mu (0.33 
hectare) (Liu and Wu, 1984:102).
Such an economic situation made the Chinese government 
leaders aware of the seriously negative impact of China’s 
huge and growing population. Despite continuing political 
turbulence, the Chinese government began to do its best to 
intensify its birth control program after 1970.
3.6 The Sixth Period (1977-): Steady Growth 
and Economic Reform
After the Great Cultural Revolution, China’s economy 
took nearly one Five-Year Plan period to adjust its 
unbalanced economic structure. Since 1978, the Chinese
government has been implementing its economic reform 
program. At present, both the change of the economic 
development strategy and the implementation of the economic 
reform program have been under pressure from a population of 
over one billion.
Facing the facts of insufficient employment, limited 
natural resources, and low standards of living, the Chinese
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government adopted several measures. Firstly, it has been 
making every effort to control fertility. According to the 
Beijing Review (1988b:9), over 210 million fewer babies than
expected were born in China between 1970 and 1987 (the 
Beijing Review did not say on what basis the figure was 
calculated). The Beijing Review also noted that an average 
of 18,700 Yuan was needed to feed, clothe, house and educate 
an urban person in his or her first 16 years. The figure 
was 6,690 Yuan for a rural person. So, over 210 million 
fewer babies born from 1970 to 1987 saved the government and 
the families a total 1.1 trillion Yuan during the period.
Secondly, the Chinese government opened all avenues to 
solve the problem of insufficient employment. In urban 
areas, the government adopted the strategy of accelerating 
development of commercial and social service businesses. 
The total employees in commerce and social services 
increased from 37.8 millions in 1976 to 81.6 million in 
1985, with a net increase of 43.8 million (Social 
Statistical Department, CSSB, 1987:8). In rural areas, the 
government adopted a development strategy of promoting the 
development of village and town industry to create more 
employment opportunities. For instance, by the end of 1980, 
there were 1.43 million village and town industrial 
enterprises with 30.5 million employees. By the end of 
1985, there were 12 million such enterprises with 70 million 
employees. In 1985, the total output value of village and 
town industry was 272.8 billion Yuan (about 85.5 billion US$ 
at the 1985 exchange rate of Yuan/US$), which is bigger than 
the total TPS of China in 1968 (Li Debin, 1987:593).
Thirdly, the government has been implementing its ’’open 
door policy" and absorbed a vast amount of foreign 
investment and foreign capital in the Sixth Five-Year Plan 
period (1981-1985). Of this, direct investment by foreign 
firms accounted for 5.3 billion US$ and 10.3 billion US$ 
was external loan (Li Debin, 1987:607). According to Zhang 
Shubao (1988:23), in the 1980s, China's average annual 
foreign debts were estimated at 15 to 20 billion US$, or 
about US$ 20 per Chinese.
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Fourthly, the government has been implementing its 
economic reform program. In rural areas, contract 
responsibility systems, which are systems to distribute 
land to farmers and let them run themselves, were a 
widespread practice. In urban areas, the government is 
trying to induce some market-oriented mechanisms to 
stimulate the state owned enterprise's development.
The implementation of the above measures has brought 
about steady and rapid economic growth since 1977 (see Table 
3.2). According to recent figures released from Beijing 
Review, China's GNP increased from 503.8 billion Yuan (about 
157.9 billion US$ at the 1985 exchange rate) in 1982 to 
1,092 billion Yuan (about 342.3 billion US$) in 1987, a 68.9 
per cent increase, calculated at constant prices. The 
national income rose from 426.1 billion Yuan (133.6 billion 
US$) to 915.3 billion Yuan (286.9 billion US$), a 66.2 per 
cent increase [Beijing Review. 1988a, June 6-12:23]. This 
steady economic growth greatly improved China's economic 
strength. Its GNP ranking rose from ninth in the world in 
1982 to seventh in 1987 (see Table 3.14).
Table 3.14 China's world ranking in terms of
main product output
GNP Cereals Cotton Meat Steel Coal Crude
oil
Electricity
1982 9 2 1 2 4 3 5 61987 7 1 1 1 4 1 5 4
Source: Beijing Review (1988a, June 6-12 : 24) .
The rapid economic growth and decline of the growth 
rate of the population quickly increased people's disposable 
income. The per capita disposable income of rural dwellers 
per annum was 133.57 Yuan (about US$ 89.6 at the 1979 
Yuan/US$ exchange rate) in 1979, 191.33 Yuan in 1980, 397 
Yuan in 1985 and 463 Yuan in 1987 (Li Debin, 1987:621; 
Beijing Review. 1988a, June 6-12:29). Excluding the price 
increase, the average per capita income of rural dwellers 
maintained a rate of increase of 13.7 per cent per annum 
from 1981 to 1985 (Zhao Ziyang, 1986).
40
For urban dwellers, the wage level of workers and staff 
of the whole country also rose (see Table 3.15), 
accompanied by mild inflation and growing inequality in the 
distribution of income within different sectors of the 
national economy and different enterprises.
Table 3.15: Wage levels of workers and staff
in China since 1977
Average wage per Index (1952=100)
annum (Yuan) Money wage Real wage
1952 445 100.0 100.0
1957 637 140.2 129.7
1977 576 129.4 104.0
1978 615 138.2 110.3
1979 668 150.1 117.8
1980 762 171.2 124.7
1981 772 173.5 123.4
1982 798 179.3 124.4
1983 826 185.6 126.7
1984 974 218.9 145.6
1985 1,148 258.0 153.5
1986 1,332 299.3 166.4
1987 1,415 317.9 -
Source: The figures before 1985 come from the Social
Statistical Department, CSSB (1987,:151); after
1985 come from the CSSB (1987, 1988).
Along with the rise of disposable income, the quantity 
of basic commodities consumed by the Chinese people has also 
increased very quickly in recent years. At present, this 
level of consumption of basic commodities exceeds the 
average of developing countries (see Table 3.16). This is a 
major reason why the Chinese people’s life expectancy is 
longer than that in most low-income countries as well as in 
most middle-income economies.
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Table 3.16 Annual per capita consumption of basic 
commodities: China and developing countries
Developing China Estimated
country average --------------  average for
(1979-81) 1980 1986 Des (1990)
Total grain 213 kg 330.5 kg 391 kg 232 kg
feed grain 36.3 kg 39.2 kg 69.8 kg 43.2 kg
Meat 12.6 kg 12.8 kg 17.5 kg 13.9 kg
Heat (daily) 2350 kcal NA 2485 kcal * NA
Protein (daily) 57.5 g NA 66.8 g* NA
Fat (daily) 40.6 g NA 49.3 g* NA
Clothing-total 
fibre 3.42 kg 3.48 kg 10.58 kg 3.83 kg
cotton 2.16 kg 2.63 kg 3.16 kg 2.22 kg
Note: The figures marked * are 1982 figures. 
Sources: Ding Shengjun (1988:20).
Although China’s economy as well as the disposable 
income of the Chinese people increased very quickly, 
production per capita is still lower than developed as well 
as many developing countries in the world due to China's 
billion population. According to the World Bank (1982, 
1984, 1987), China’s GNP per capita ranks about 20th from 
the bottom out of 126 countries.
Some scholars argue that although GNP per capita is a 
good indicator of economic development, occasionally its 
numbers are deceptive. This is true in countries where a 
large portion of the population is employed in subsistence 
agriculture and only marginally involved in the cash economy 
(Population Crisis Committee, 1987). So GNP per capita is a 
good but imperfect indicator of economic development. Such 
being the case, some scholars have tried to develop other 
indices to measure socio-economic development. For example, 
Morris and McAlpin (1982) developed the Physical Quality of 
Life Index (the PQLI). Recently the Population Crisis 
Committee constructed the Human Suffering Index (the HSI) 
that statistically ranks living conditions in 130 countries. 
The HSI value for each country is calculated by adding 
scores (0 to 10, the most distressful being 10) for ten 
measures of human welfare. The ten measures are GNP per 
capita, average annual rate of inflation, average annual
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growth of labour force, average annual growth of urban 
population, infant mortality rate, daily per capita calorie 
supply as a percentage of requirements, access to clean 
drinking water, energy consumption per capita, and personal 
freedom (Population Crisis Committee, 1987). If the Human 
Suffering Index is regarded as an indicator of socio­
economic development, even though the personal freedom in 
China on the index was apparently overweighted by the 
Population Crisis Committee, China would rank 50th out of 
130 countries, compared with 97th out of 126 countries if 
GNP per capita is considered (see Table 3.17):
Table 3.17: Human Suffering Index, GNP per capita and 
population growth in selected countries
Countries
HSI
Index Rank
GNP per 
1985 US$
capita
Rank
Average an­
nual growth 
of Populat­
ion 1980-85
1 2 3 4 5
Switzerland 4 1 16,370 2 0.2
United States 8 5 16,690 1 1.0
Japan 11 10 11,300 6 0.7
Australia 16 16 10,830 10 1.4
Singapore 18 22 7,420 27 1.2
Hong Kong 29 32 6,230 29 1.4
Thailand 47 55 800 65 2.1
China 50 57 310 97 1.2
Brazil 50 57 1,640 46 2.3
Philippines 55 66 580 74 2.5
Egypt 55 66 610 73 2.8
India 61 73 270 103 2.2
Burma 61 73 190 110 2.0
Indonesia 62 77 530 78 2.1
Pakistan 73 94 380 91 3.1
Mozambique 95 130 160 114 2.6
Source: 1), The figures in column 1 and 2 come from
Population Crisis Committee (1987) .
2) , The figure in columns 3, 4 and 5 come from
World Bank (1987).
Even so, to achieve the economic development goal of 
GNP per capita of US$ 800 by the year 2000, accelerating 
economic growth and controlling fertility are still 
pressing tasks facing the Chinese government.
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CHAPTER FOUR: A SYNTHETIC APPROACH TO THE MACRO-EFFECTS 
OF POPULATION GROWTH ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN CHINA SINCE 1949
" An extra person but no more food
Just another pair of chopsticks [at the table]”
----  A Popular Chinese Expression
As noted in Chapter One, because demographic variables 
have intricate interrelationships with the economy, there 
are many controversies about the impact of population 
growth on economic development. In an article (Li Weisen, 
1988), the author of this thesis has briefly reviewed the 
literature relating to population and economic development 
from Malthus to the report of the Working Group on 
Population Growth and Economic Development of the National 
Research Council of the United States (1986). Here we 
should be aware that the economic-demographic model is a 
useful tool in studying the economic consequences of 
population growth, and since the 1950s some demographers
and economists have built many macroeconomic-demographic 
models that try to measure the impact of population growth
on economic development in a mathematical way. For 
example, using the eight-equation growth model. Coale and 
Hoover (1958) projected per capita income for India under 
low, medium and high fertility assumptions. Focussing on 
the impacts of educational and health policies on long-run 
growth in per capita income, Barlow and Davies (1974) 
constructed a systematic model of a representative 
developing country. A significant development in 
macroeconomic-demographic modelling in developing countries 
was the advent of the International Labour Organization’s 
well known models (i.e the BACHUE series of models of 
Kenya, Brazil, Philippines, Yugoslavia and International) 
that contain multi-sectional input-output models 
incorporating features of economic dualism (Hopkins, et al.
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1976; Anker and Farooq, 1978; Rodgers et al 1978; Anker 
and Knowles, 1983). Wheeler (1984) also developed a small, 
long-run economic-demographic model that focuses on the 
growth outcomes associated with investments in education and 
family planning (Ahlburg, 1987: 495). Moreover, other 
economists and demographers, for instance, Simon (1977, 
1986), Kelley and Williamson (1980, 1982, 1984a, 1984b), 
and Mohan (1984), have constructed some macroeconomic- 
demographic models. There is no doubt that all the above 
mentioned economic-demographic models that try to simulate 
the complicated relationships between population change and 
economic development in a simplified, mathematical way may 
be helpful or useful to evaluate the macroeconomic 
consequences of population growth in China since 1949. But 
due to deficiencies of data and limitations of time, this 
preliminary approach will not attempt sophisticated 
modelling to estimate the impacts of population growth on 
economic development.
Before estimating the macro-effects of population 
growth on economic development in China since 1949, it is 
necessary to define economic development. Meier (1984:5-6) 
noted: "Although requiring careful interpretation perhaps 
the definition that would now gain widest approval is one 
that defines economic development as the process whereby the 
real per capita income of a country increases over a long 
period of time --subject to the stipulation that the number 
below an 'absolute poverty line’ does not increase, and 
that the distribution of income does not become more 
unequal". Meier also noted that economic development is not 
to be equated simply with industrialization as well as 
national development because the later encompasses social 
and political development. Other scholars distinguish 
economic development from economic growth. For example, 
Weeks (1981:225) proposed: "economic growth refers to an 
increase in the total amount of wealth in a nation without 
regard to the total number of people, whereas economic 
development related that amount of wealth to the number of 
people". The World Bank (1974) also suggested that the most 
common definition of economic development is that it
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represents a growth in average income, usually defined as 
per capita income. Applying the distinction between 
economic growth and economic development, this study will 
estimate the macro-economic costs of population growth in 
China since 1949 from two aspects: (1) the effects of 
population growth on macro-economic growth; (2) the impact 
of population growth on economic development.
4.1 China’s Huge and Growing Population as a 
Stimulus to Macro-Economic Growth
According to both Keynes (1937:13-18) and Hansen 
(1939:1-15), population growth has some positive impact on 
economic growth through stimulating ’’effective demand”. Is 
this theory applicable to China? The huge population size 
and the low level of the Chinese people's living standard 
surely means that China is a vast potential market. So a 
logical conclusion seems to be that China’s huge population 
size and its growth may bring about demand-pulled economic 
growth. But as Coale and Hoover (1958:21) noted, it does 
not necessarily follow that the huge population size and its 
growth serve as a major stimulus to economic growth since 
they do not automatically translate into "effective demand”. 
In other words, there are some complex social mechanisms 
between demographic variables and "effective demand" and 
resulting macro-economic growth:
Effective
demand
size and its
population
growth
Demand-pulled 
economic 
growth
Here the black box represents particular socio-economic 
institutions.
Of course, in China, excess of demand over supply and 
shortage of consumption goods and productive materials have 
been constant phenomena for nearly forty years. Especially 
after implementing the economic reform program, the total 
demand of the society has been greatly in excess of the
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total supply for several years. The cause of such over- 
demand is not mainly due to demographic variables but rather 
to the variables of the socio-economic systems since China 
is a centrally planned economy. According to the famous 
Hungarian economist Kornai (1980), the socialist or
centrally planned economy is a ’’shortage economy” with 
"investment hunger" and shortage of consumption goods. For 
instance, the shortage of consumption goods and capital 
scarcity resulting from "investment hunger" and excess- 
demand are common phenomena in USSR, China and Eastern 
European countries. Therefore over-demand, and thus
demand-pulled economic growth, should not be attributed
mainly to China’s population size and its growth but to 
China’s socio-economic systems.
Even so, it still may be said that China’s huge 
population size and its growth in the last forty years 
created a vast scope for economic growth. Although not the 
underlying causes, demographic variables may have
contributed to economic growth. Or in other words, the
low level of the Chinese people's living standards under the 
particular socio-economic institutions contributed to 
excess-demand for consumption goods and productive 
materials, thus to demand-pulled economic growth. The 
obvious evidence is that there is hardly any glut of 
consumption goods and deficiencies of demand which often 
hinder macro-economic growth in developed and mature 
economies. Under the particular conditions of Chinese 
society, if the socio-economic mechanisms in the "black box" 
were replaced with rational and smooth ones, China's economy 
would take off quickly. At present, adjusting the
mechanisms and relationships in the "black box" is the 
first aim of China's current economic reform program.
4.2 An Estimate of the Contribution of the Increment 
in the Labour Force to Macro-Economic 
Growth in China since 1952
Some scholars believe that a plentiful labour force in 
China is beneficial to China’s economic growth. For
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example, when talking about substitution between human 
capital and material capital, the American development 
economists Kindleberger and Herrick (1977:89) noted: ’’The
Chinese efforts to increase investment without reducing 
material consumption by using '’excess’ labour as a form of 
saving and capital formation is probably the best-known 
example of this probability”. Nowadays, this proposition 
can be tested quantitatively by estimating the contribution 
of increments in labour force to output in China using the 
following formula:
GDPr = Lr + Pr + Lr*Pr (Formula 4.1)
Here GDPr is the rate of increase in Gross Domestic 
Product; Lr is the rate of increase in labour force in 
employment;. Pr is the rate of increase in productivity; 
Lr*Pr is residual.
Because productivity is output per head of labour force, 
which is:
P = GDP / L
Then,
GDP = L • P
Here, GDP is the Gross Domestic Product; L is the 
number employed; and P is productivity, which is output per 
head of all employees. In addition, because:
Li = Li-i + AL Pi = Pi - i + AP
Lr t = AL / Li - i P r i = A P / P i _ a
GDPi = GDPi-i + AGDP GDPr* = AGDP / GDPi-i
Theref ore,
GDP* - GDPi-i GDPi
GDPri =
GDP i - i GDPi-i
1
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L i  • P t L t  P ±
1 _
L i - i  • P i - x
-L — •
L i - l  P i - 1
L i. - 1 -4- A  L P i - 1  + A P
1
L t  -  x
1
P * - x
zz ( 1 + A L  /  L t .■1 ) * (  1 + A P  /  P i - i  )
= ( 1 -i- L r  i  ) • ( 1 + P r *  ) -  1
= 1 + L r t  -i- P r t + L r ! • P r  t  -  1
u-4It i  + P r , .  + L r i * ' P r !
Therefore,
GDPr = Lr + Pr + Lr-Pr (i.e Formula 4.1}
Now GDPr and Lr are given by the Chinese State 
Statistical Bureau (see Table 4.1). What is needed is only 
to calculate Pr, as show in Table 4.1:
Table 4.1 Average rate of increase in social productivity per annum, China: 1953-1985
Year GDP
(million 
US$)
1
L
(mill­
ion )
2
P
(US$
3=1/2
Period GDPr
(%)
4
Pr
(%)
5-or _Ms
1952 48552 207.29 234.22
1957 75046 237.71 315.70 1953-1957 9.1 6.15
1962 67146 259.10 259.15 1958-1962 -2.2 -3.87
1965 101855 286.70 355.27 1963-1965 14.9 11.09
1970 142190 344.32 412.96 1966-1970 6.9 3.06
1975 185836 381.68 486.89 1971-1975 5.5 3.35
1980 252230* 418.96 602.04 1976-1980 6.3 4.34
1985 408069 498.73 818.22 1981-1985 10.1 3.86
1953-1980 6.7 3.86
Source:
1) , The figure marked * in column 1 comes from the World 
Bank (1982:Table 3). Other figures were derived 
based on estimation of GDP in China in 1980 of the 
World Bank (the figure marked*) by using GDPr in 
column 4.
2) , The figures in column 2 come from the Social 
Statistical Department (CSSB 1987:3).
3) , The figures in column 4 come from the Department of 
National Economic Balance, CSSB (1987:46)
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According to the formula of GDPr = Lr + Pr + Lr«Pr. the 
share contributed by increased employment to increments of 
GDP can be evaluated (see the Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 Increment in GDP: China (1953-1985) {%)
Contribution in 
increase in GDP(%)
Period GDPr Lr Pr LrPr
Total
Due to 
Lr
Due to 
Pr
1 2 3 4 5 = 2/1 6 = 3/1
1953-1957 9.1 2.78 6.15 0.17 100 30.5 67.6
1958-1962 -2.2 1.74 -3.87 -0.07 100 79.1 -175.9
1963-1965 14.9 3.43 11.09 0.38 100 23.0 74.4
1966-1970 6.9 3.73 3.06 0.11 100 54.1 44.3
1971-1975 5.5 2.08 3.35 0.07 100 37.8 60.9
1976-1980 6.3 1.88 4.34 0.08 100 29.8 68.9
1981-1985 10.1 3.55 6.33 0.22 100 35.1 62.7
1953-1985 6.7 2.70 3.86 0.14 100 40.3 57.6
Note.- a) , Figures
constant
in columns 1 
prices.
and 3 are calculated at
Sources.- 1), Figures in column 1 come from the Department
of National Economic Balance, CSSB (1987:46).
2), Figures in column 2 were computed from data from
the Social Statistical Department, CSSB (1986:5).
3), Figures in column 3 come from Table 3.1.
From Table 4.2, it can be seen that from 1953 to 1985, 
the increase of the labour force contributed about 40 per 
cent to the increase in GDP. But such a proportion does not 
mean that by increasing labour force China's population 
growth is beneficial to macro-economic growth. because 
there is a substituting relation between increase in labour 
force and increase in productivity. In addition, compared 
with other countries in the world, the contribution of 
labour force to increase in national income is not too large 
(see Table 4.3). For example, according to the World Bank's 
estimate, from 1960 to 1982, the contribution of increase 
in labour force to growth of GDP in China was lower than the 
average of low-income economies and middle-income economies 
as well as upper-middle-income economies. It should be 
pointed out here, the World Bank's estimate of average 
annual rate of increase in labour force in China is lower
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than the real one. According to the CSSB, from i960 to 
1970, labour force in China maintained an average rate of 
increase of 2.9 per cent (Social Statistical Department, 
CSSB, 1987:4). Therefore, re-computing the contribution of 
increase in labour force to increase in GDP by the CSSB 
figures, gives 58 per cent from 1957 to 1970. It was the 
highest in the world during the period. From Table 4.1. it 
also can be calculated that the average rate of increase in 
productivity in China between 1957 and 1970 was only 2.1 per 
cent. So from these figures we can conclude that the rapid 
increase in labour force during the period had an adverse 
impact on increase in productivity. Here we must be clearly 
aware that the slow growth of GDP during this period was 
also related to the disastrous policies of the Great Leap 
Forward and political turbulence during the Great Cultural 
Revolution. With appropriate policies and a stable 
political and social situation, productivity in China would 
have increased faster, even though the labour force was 
growing rapidly. Here it should be also noted that using 
the ratio of Lr / GDPr to estimate the contribution of 
increase in labour force to growth of GDP, it is better to 
subtract unemployment from the numerator, Lr, because it 
cannot be expected that the unemployed still produce GDP. 
Since information about world-wide unemployment during the 
period is not available, the figures of average annual 
change in percentage in labour force (i.e. economically 
active population) from the World Bank were used. 
Therefore, in some countries with a high unemployment rate, 
the contribution of labour force in employment to rise of 
GDP may be overestimated.
Whether the increase in the labour force resulting from 
China’s population growth is beneficial or detrimental to 
China's macro-economic growth can be evaluated in another 
way by considering China’s economic growth dynamics. If the 
annual rate of increase in productivity retained a rate of 
6.15 per cent during 1953 and 1957 (see Table 4.2), only a 
0.79 annual rate of increase in labour force from 1958 to 
1985 is needed to reach the same level of national income in 
1985. From this figure, it can be reckoned that there must
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be plenty of surplus labour in China. The figure is also 
consistent with some Chinese scholars’ estimates of the 
surplus labour force in China. For example, Jiang Yu et al 
(1987) estimated that there is a superfluous labour force of 
100 million in rural areas in China; while Zhong Wanmin and 
Lu Bingquan (1987) estimated that the figure should be 120 
million. According to the Population Statistical
Department, CSSB (1987:60), based on a sample survey which 
covered 773 counties and 11.5 million rural households, the 
surplus labour force numbers at least 60 million, 15.7 per 
cent of total rural labour force. In urban areas, according 
to estimates of the Ministry of Labour and Personal Affairs 
of the Chinese government, disguised unemployment in urban 
areas is at least 20 million. Of these 15 million are 
surplus workers in state-owned enterprises, according to 
Luo Gan, the Labour Minister of the Chinese government 
(Beijing Review. 1988c:7). Some experts estimate that the 
figure of surplus labourers in state-owned and collective 
enterprises in urban areas should be 25 to 30 million (Wang 
Wenjie and Li Weiping, 1988;1; Beiiing Review. 1988c:7). 
Despite large differences among the above estimates, it is 
clear that there is a substantial amount of surplus labour 
in China at present. The problem of idle labourers is 
seriously damaging the national economy according to the 
Beijing Review. Based on average annual spending per
worker of 2,000 Yuan (about US$ 538) - including wages and 
benefits, the costs to the state-owned and collective 
enterprises alone accounted for 50-60 billion Yuan a year 
(Beijing Review, 1988c:7). Thus it seems that population 
growth, by increasing the labour force, is detrimental
instead of being beneficial to macro-economic growth, even 
though appropriate policies could have led to faster 
macroeconomic growth.
4.3 Population Growth as an Inhibitor of 
Macro-Economic Growth in China
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, most 
Chinese as well as foreign scholars believe that China’s
Table 4.4 Population growth, economic growth,
and investment: China (1952-1985)
, savings
(%)
Year CRNI Yr Sr Ir
1 2 3 4
1952 2.0 22.3 21.4 7.2
1953 2.3 14.0 23.4 12.6
1954 2.479 5.8 25.5 13.4
1955 2.032 6.4 22.9 13.0
1956 2.05 14.1 24.4 18.1
1957 2.323 4.5 24.9 16.2
1958 1.724 22.0 33.9 25.0
1959 1.019 8.2 43.8 28.9
1960 -0.457 -1.4 39.6 33.0
1961 0.378 -29.7 19.2 15.4
1962 2.699 -6.5 10.4 9.2
1963 3.333 10.7 17.5 11.1
1964 2.764 16.5 22.2 14.0
1965 2.838 17.0 27.1 16.1
1966 2.622 17.0 30.6 16.6
1967 2.553 -7.2 21.3 13.1
1968 2.738 -6.5 21.1 10.8
1969 2.608 19.3 23.2 16.1
1970 2.583 23.3 32.9 19.6
1971 2.333 7.0 24.1 20.8
1972 2.216 2.9 31.6 20.1
1973 2.089 8.3 32.9 19.5
1974 1.748 1.1 32.3 20.2
1975 1.569 8.3 33.9 22.2
1976 1.266 -2.7 30.9 21.6
1977 1.206 7.8 32.3 21.3
1978 1.2 12.3 36.5 22.5
1979 1 . 161 7.0 34.6 20.8
1980 1 . 187 6.4 31.5 20.2
1981 1.455 4.9 28.3 17.1
1982 1.449 8.3 28.8 19.7
1983 1 . 154 9.8 29.7 19.9
1984 1.081 13.5 31.5 20.8
1985 1 . 123 12.7 35.3 22.4
Note: 1), CRNI is the Crude Rate of Natural Increase; Yr
is annual growth rate of national income; Sr is
savings ratio; Ir is investment of fixed capital as
a percentage of available national income in state 
owned enterprises.
2), Column 2 as calculated at constant prices; 
columns 3 and 4 were calculated at current prices.
Sources: a), Figures in column 1 derived from Table 1.1
b) , Figures in columns 2 and 3 come from the 
Department of National Economic Balance, CSSB 
(1987:46, 2, 57).
c) , Figures in column 4 were derived from CSSB 
(1987:472) and the Department of National Economic 
Balance, CSSB (1987:2).
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huge and growing population is a serious burden for economic 
growth. For example, Chen and Zhang (1986:346) proposed 
that two major factors inhibited China's economic growth in 
the last forty years: one is rapid population growth; 
another is the imbalance of consumption and savings in 
available national income. The quotation of the Yomiuri 
used as a headpiece to Chapter Two also expresses the same 
point of view.
Nowadays, based on data released by the CSSB recently, 
the proposition can be quantitatively tested, using the 
information given in Table 4.4 to correlate population 
growth and macro-economic growth in China since 1953.
Table 4.5 Pearson's Product-Moment Co-efficient of 
correlation between population growth rate and
rate
and
of increase in national income, 
investment ratios: China (1952-
the savings 
1985)
Yr Sr Ir
F value 3.424 17.983 31.398
r 0.2743 -0.5998 -0.7037
Note: Critical value of F is 4.154 at the 0.05 level.
Table 4.5 shows that the population growth rate has 
very strong correlations with the savings ratio (the 
proportion of accumulation as a percentage of available 
national income), especially with the fixed capital 
investment ratio (the proportion of investment of fixed 
capital as a percentage of available national income). In 
addition, in the light of the fact that the regression 
coefficients r in both regression equations of CRNI with the 
savings ratio and CRNI with the fixed capital investment 
ratio are negative, it can be concluded that population 
growth has some adverse effects on capital investment in 
China since 1952. From this point of view, according to the 
Harrod-Domar model (Harrod 1939, 1948; Domar, 1948, 1952), 
i.e. output being a function of capital investment alone, it 
can be said that if China's population grew more slowly then 
China's economic growth would take place more easily.
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However, even though population growth in China in the 
last forty years has had some negative impacts on capital 
investment, the regression analysis does not show that the 
crude rate of natural increase of population in China is 
significantly correlated with macro-economic growth. The F 
value of the regression analysis of population growth and 
macro-economic growth in Table 4.5 shows that there are no 
significant correlations between the population growth rate 
and the rate of increase in national income. Of course, 
based on the regression analysis alone it cannot be 
concluded that population growth in China since 1949 has 
no interplay with macro-economic growth, because there are 
too many other variables correlated with both sides. But 
the analysis of the relationship between the population 
growth rate and the rate of increase in national income does 
not show any evidence that population growth in China since 
1949 is a major inhibitor of macro-economic growth.
There are two possible explanations of the result that 
there is no significant correlation between CRNI and Yr. 
On the one hand, although rapid population growth has some 
negative impacts on savings and capital investment, due to 
particular saving mechanisms (i.e saving is mostly done by 
government but not by households and private business), and 
due to the government’s policy of accelerating 
industrialization at the expense of improving people's 
living standards, the savings ratio and investment ratio in 
China since 1949 have remained quite high. According to 
figures from CSSB, accumulation (savings ratio) accounted 
for an average proportion of 30.6 per cent of national 
income available per annum from 1953 to 1985. According to 
the normal patterns of world development advanced by Chenry 
and Syrquin, the investment proportion of GDP in the 
countries with the level of GNP per capita of US$ 300 
generally is 15.8 per cent (Chenry and Syrquin, 1975:38). 
According to estimates of the Observation Group of the World 
Bank (1985), investment accounted for 34.5 per cent of GDP 
in China (1981) during a period when China's GNP per capita 
was below US$ 300. Such a high investment rate is equal to 
the level of Japan’s when its GNP per capita reached US$ 500
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and the level of other developed countries when their GNP 
per capita reached US$ 1,500 (Zhou Qiran et al, 1987:102). 
On the other hand, population growth inevitably followed an 
increase in labour supply as well as an increase in 
employment in China’s employment system characteristic with 
minimizing unemployment. This surely contributed to 
increases of GNP as well as national income as Table 4.2 
indicates. Combining the two factors, it is possible that 
China's population growth since 1949 is not significantly 
correlated with macro-economic growth.
Given that China's huge and growing population is not 
the major inhibitor of macro-economic growth, what is? 
Figure 4.1 clearly shows that China's economic growth was 
obstructed or interrupted by the Chinese government’s 
political movements. It can be observed that nearly every 
trough of China's economic growth coincided with a political 
movement.
China’s economic growth can now be roughly outlined. 
The story can be expressed as follows: China's economic 
growth was pushed by the government’s efforts and ambitions 
of industrialization and modernization; drawn by the over­
demand for consumption goods, which was partly induced by 
China's huge and growing population under China's particular 
socio-economic institutions; and obstructed by the 
government's political movements:
China’s
economy
efforts of indus­
trialization and
modernization
Social over-demand
growing population
partly induced by
the huge and
Legend: push; 4 pull.
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4.4 The Effects of Population Growth on Economic 
Development: Per capita National
Income and Per Capita Consumption
From 1949 to 1987, China’s population nearly doubled, 
with an increment of 538.3 million people. As noted above, 
the regression analysis shows that there is no significant 
correlation between population growth and macro-economic 
growth in China from 1953 to 1985. Now the further 
questions are, what is the impact of population growth on 
economic development and what is the macro-economic costs of 
the population growth?
Even though « the population growth in China since 1949 
has no significant correlation with China's macro-economic 
growth, it has had a strong influence on China’s economic 
development expressed in terms of per capita products. For 
instance, from 1953 to 1985, China's national income 
increased by a rather phenomenal rate of 823.2 per cent 
(Department of National Economic Balance, CSSB, 1987:13). 
Yet during this time China’s population increased by 470.5 
million (the CSSB, 1987:89), and as a result national income 
per capita only increased by 452.7 per cent. Thus population 
growth consumed 45 per cent of the total improvement in 
national income.
If we ignore possible direct effects of population 
growth on aggregate economic growth, then for a given rate 
of economic growth, per capita product will be lower the 
faster the rate of population growth. Table 4.6 clearly 
shows the impact of population growth as well as economic 
growth on increases in GNP per capita.
From Table 4.6, it can be observed that the average 
annual change of GNP per capita in China was lower than the 
average of all developing countries as well as the world 
average during the period of China's rapid population growth 
of 1955-1970. Between 1970 and 1980, that is the period of 
rapid decline in the population growth rate in China, the 
average increase in the rate of GNP per capita was higher 
than every country except for Japan. Table 4.6 clearly 
shows that population growth in China does have some
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negative impact on economic development. Of course, it 
should be noted from this table that the major decisive 
factor in the increase in GNP per capita is economic growth 
but not population growth.
Because an increase in GNP per capita or national 
income per capita is not immediately realized as a rise in 
living standards in a country, it is better to use some 
indices that measure people's well-being and physical 
comfort. In this thesis, the concept of national welfare, 
which is defined as consumption per capita, is used. We 
define national welfare by the following formula:
W = C / Pop (Formula 4.2)
Because Y = S + C 
Sr = S / Y 
S = Sr Y 
C = Y - Sr•Y
C Y - Sr» Y
Therefore, W = ----- = --------
Pop Pop
Here, W is national welfare indicated by consumption 
per capita; Y is national income (in this formula it is
available national income); S is savings; Sr is savings 
ratio, that is, the proportion of savings in available 
national income; Pop is number of population.
Change of national welfare depends on three factors: 
one is increase in available national income; one is change 
of savings ratio; and another one is growth rate of 
population. The interrelation among these variables can be 
expressed by the following formula:
(1 - Sro 1
Wrt = (1 + Yr±)-------------- • --------- - 1
(1 —’ Sr i. — i) 1 + Gr i
(Formula 4.3)
Here, Wr is rate of increase in national welfare; Yr 
is rate of increase in national income; Sr is savings ratio; 
Gr is growth rate of population.
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The inferential procedure of the formula is as follows: 
Y Sr-Y
Because W = -----------
Pop
and Wr = A H  / Wx_x = w* / Wt-i - i
Wr x —
Yt - Sr*. Yi Yi-i
/
- Sr*-x* Yi-i - 1
Popi
/
P0Pi-i
While, Yi = Yi-x + AY Yri = A Y  / Yi-x
Popx = Popx -x + A Pop Grx = A  Pop / Popx-i
Theref ore, 
Wr i. = Yt - Sri' Yi Y,-, - Sr.-i'Y,.,--------------  / ------------------------l
PoPi-1
Popi_a
PoPi
Y i  -  S r t ' Y t  
Y * - t  -  S r i - x • Y i - 1  Popx
( Y t - x  + A Y )  -  S r  ± • ( Y i - i  + AY)  
Y i - 1 -  S r i _ i ‘ Y i - x  
Y i - x  + AY (1 - S r i )
- 1
P o p i - i
Popi - x + APop
- 1
- 1
Yi-i (1-Sri-i) 1 + Gr*
(1 - Srt) i
(1 + Yrt) -  1
Therefore,
Wr* = (1 + Yr*) .
(1 — Sri — x) 1 + Gr x
(1 - Sr*)
-  1
(1 - Sr*-*) 1 + Gr*
4 (i.e. Formula 4.3)
From Formula 4.3, it can be shown that the value of 
rate of increase in national welfare is directly 
proportional to that of rate of national increase in income, 
and inversely proportional to that of changes in the savings 
ratio and the growth rate of the population. Therefore, 
under a situation of a given growth rate of national income 
and a given savings ratio, population growth does reduce 
improvement in the national welfare.
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Using Formula A.3, the impact of population growth on 
improvement of national welfare can be quantitatively 
evaluated (see Table 4.7. The detailed calculation is shown 
in Appendix Table 3)
Table 4.7 Annual percentage change 
welfare: China, 1952-1985
in national
(%)
Year Yr Sr Gr Wr Year Yr Sr Gr Wr
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1952 21.4 1969 10.1 23.2 2.636 4.4
1953 13.3 23.1 2.122 8.5 1970 21.7 32.9 2.94 3.3
1954 4.8 25.5 2.675 -1.1 1971 6.8 34.1 2.699 2.1
1955 5.1 22.9 1.991 6.6 1972 2.0 31.6 2.288 3.5
1956 9.9 24.4 2.212 5.4 1973 9.4 32.9 2.329 4.9
1957 4.6 24.9 2.897 1.0 1974 1.3 32.3 1.85 0.4
1958 18.1 33.9 2.073 1.8 1975 6.9 33.9 1.762 2.6
1959 12.1 43.8 1.972 -6.5 1976 -1.3 30.9 1.407 1.7
1960 -11.3 39.6 -1.488 -3.2 1977 5.0 32.3 1.344 1.5
1961 -35.6 19.2 -0.529 -13.4 1978 14.4 36.5 1.369 5.9
1962 0.2 10.4 2.187 8.7 1979 7.6 34.6 1.33 9.3
1963 21.4 17.5 2.779 8.8 1980 5.3 31.5 1.2 9.0
1964 16.0 22.2 1.923 7.3 1981 3.1 28.3 1.378 6.4
1965 19.3 27.1 2.894 3.6 1982 8.2 28.8 1.469 5.9
1966 12.8 30.6 2.757 4.5 1983 10.0 29.7 0.945 7.6
1967 -6.9 21.3 2.45 3.3 1984 17.2 31.5 0.956 13.1
1968 -1.7 21.1 2.828 -4.1 1985 22.0 35.3 1.121 14.0
1953-57 7.4 24.2 2.379 4.0
1958-62 -5.4 30.8 0.807 -2.7
1963-65 18.8 22.7 2.531 8.0
1966-70 6.7 26.3 2.727 2.2
1971-75 5.2 33.0 2.176 2.7
1976-80 6.0 33.2 1.326 5.4
1981-85 11.9 31.4 1.174 9.2
1953-85 6.2 30.6 1.778 3.7
Note: a), Yr in this table is rate of increase in available 
national income. It is different from rate of increase 
in national income due to differences between import 
and export and to statistical discrepancies.
b) , Gr is annual change rate of population which 
differs from CRNI in Table 1.1 that come from 
the Population Research Centre, CASS (1985).
c) , Sr is savings ratio.
d) , The figures in this table were calculated at 
. constant prices.
Source: 1), Sr comes from the Department of National 
Economic Balance, CSSB (1987:2).
2), Other figures come from Appendix Table 3.
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Table 4.7 clearly shows that although the national 
income available maintained an average growth rate of 6.2 
per annum from 1953 to 1985, the average rate of increase in 
national welfare was 3.7 per annum, mainly due to 
population growth. Especially during the period of rapid 
population growth in China from the middle of the 1960s and 
the middle of the 1970s, the rate of improvement of national 
welfare was below 2.7 per cent per annum. The figures 
clearly show that population growth has some adverse impact 
on the improvement of people’s well-being.
The detrimental effect of population growth on 
improvement of people’s well-being can be more clearly 
demonstrated by computing indices of national income and
Table 4.8 Index of available national income, consumption
and national welfare!: China, 1952--1985 <%)
Year Y C Wr Year Y C Wr
1 2 3 1 2 3
1952 100.0 100.0 100.0 1969 207.6 202.9 144.6
1953 115.8 111.0 108.6 1970 252.7 215.9 149.6
1954 118.8 112.5 107.4 1971 270.0 226.4 152.7
1955 124.9 122.7 114.7 1972 275.2 239.6 158.0
1956 137.2 132.1 120.8 1973 301.2 257.1 165.6
1957 143.5 137.2 121.9 1974 305.1 262.8 166.3
1958 169.5 142.6 124.1 1975 326.2 274.4 170.7
1959 190.0 135.9 116.2 1976 322.1 283.2 173.7
1960 168.5 129.6 112.5 1977 338.2 291.4 176.4
1961 108.6 111. 7 97.5 1978 387.0 312.7 186.8
1962 108.7 124.0 105.8 1979 416.3 346.5 204.2
1963 132.0 138.6 115.2 1980 438.4 382.2 222.5
1964 153.0 151.6 123.6 1981 451.9 412.4 236.9
1965 182.5 169.3 134.2 1982 483.8 442.9 250.3
1966 205.9 181.8 140.1 1983 537.9 481.0 269.7
1967 191.8 192.0 144.5 1984 630.1 549.3 305.1
1968 188.5 189.3 138.6 1985 763.5 632.8 347.6
Note.- a), The figures in this table are calculated at
constant prices.
b) , Available national income distinguishes from 
national income due to imports and exports and to 
statistical discrepancies.
c) , National welfare is consumption per capita. 
Source: 1), the figures in column 1 and column 3 come from
Appendix Table 3.
2), The figures in column 2 come from the Department 
of National Economic Balance, CSSB (1987:19).
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consumption as well as consumption per capita (see Table 4.8 
and Figure 4.2).
From Table 4.8 and Figure 4.2, the detrimental effect 
of population growth in China on improvement of people’s 
well-being over thirty years can be clearly seen. From 1952 
to 1985, China's national income available shows a 
phenomenal increase, nearly eight-fold. Along with the 
increase in available national income, the total amount of 
consumption in China also rose 6.3 times. But due to 
population growth, consumption per capita only rose 3.5 
times. The cause of the gap between the curve of consumption 
and the curve of national welfare is obviously population 
growth.
4.5 The Macro-Economic Costs of Population Growth
in China since 1949
The detrimental effect of population growth on economic 
development in China since 1949 also can be evaluated by 
estimating the demographic overheads. These are defined as 
total costs of the extra population to all society, 
including extra consumption required by the increment in 
population, ensuring that people's living standards do not 
decline, and extra capital investment by the increment in 
labour force, ensuring that capital per unit of labour does 
not drop. Table 4.9 was constructed based on information 
released by CSSB.
It should be pointed out here, the figures in Table 4.9 
are only conjectural estimates obtained by evaluating the 
amount of additional consumption demanded by the increment 
in population and the additional amount of savings demanded 
by the increment in social labour force (increment in total 
number of workers and staff in the state-owned enterprises 
and agencies and in the collective-owned enterprises: this 
excludes labour force in rural areas). Although the figures 
in Table 4.9 are only conjectural estimates, the table still 
generally indicates the macro-costs of population growth in 
China over the period 1953-1982. From Table 4.9, the 
following points can be observed:
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Firstly, before the 1980s, except in the period between 
1963 and 1965, the total amount of additional consumption 
demanded by the extra population and additional capital 
investment demanded by the increment in social employees 
exceeded the increment in available national income. In 
such cases, the only two choices for government planners are 
either maintaining the accumulation rate at the expense of 
improvement of living standards or improving the people's 
living standard at the expense of the capital investment 
ratio. While the first choice must bring slower 
improvement or even a decline in people’s living standards, 
the latter choice must bring about "disguised unemployment" 
thus slowing down the rise of productivity. As shown in 
Table 4.2, during the periods of the Great Leap Forward and 
the Great Cultural Revolution, the rate of increase in 
social productivity was lowest, and the speed of improvement 
of living standards was also lowest (see Appendix Tables 5 
and 6). Even during 1958 and 1962, both productivity and 
living standards had a negative growth rate.
Secondly, during the first baby boom 1953-1957, about 
32.3 per cent of the increment in consumption of available 
national income was consumed by extra people. And during the 
second baby boom of 1962-1972, about half the increment in 
consumption was consumed by extra people. As a result, 
although the macro-economy grew very quickly during these 
two periods, the rate of improvement of living standards 
slackened. This also indicates that the population growth 
has a direct impact on improvement of consumption per head. 
This result is consistent with the analysis above.
Thirdly, from 1953 to 1985, nearly 86.4 per cent of the 
increment in available national income was consumed by extra 
people and the increment in employees. The figure indicates 
why decisions about whether to allocate available national 
income to improvement of living standards or to capital 
investment have been a headache for Chinese government 
planners for nearly forty years. On the one hand, they have 
been pushed by requirement of improving living standards; 
on the other hand, they have always been troubled by the 
shortage of capital for macro-economic growth. Under such a
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Situation, a high rate of population growth forces the 
diversion of available national income to consumption by 
extra people and social overheads so that the average level 
of consumption could not fall. This prevents an increase in 
investable capital to equip workers and improve technology, 
and thus precludes a satisfactory rise in productivity.
4.6 A Simulated Framework of Interrelationships 
between Population Growth and Economic 
Development in China Since 1949
So far this thesis has reviewed the histories of 
population growth and economic development in China since 
1949 and examined the major paths of interlinking 
relationships between demographic variables and economic 
variables. The story of the interlinking mechanisms
between population growth and economic development in China 
since 1949 can be simulated as in Figure 4.3.
From Figure 4.3, it can be seen that, except that the 
increase in labour force (employees) contributes to macro- 
economic growth and that shortage of consumption goods 
resulting from population growth may be a pull-factor of 
macro-economic growth, other major paths of interlinking 
relationships between population and development in China 
since 1949 are negative. So, precisely evaluating the 
impact of population growth on economic development in China 
since 1949 is still difficult, and may need more complex 
macroeconomic-demographic models. However, we can reach
the qualitative conclusion that population growth in China 
since 1949 does have some negative impact on economic 
development.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
"We are unlikely to know much about a.subject 
unless we can measure it in some wav".
---  Lord Kelvin's assertion
(Cited in Kindelberger and 
Herrick, 1977:6)
From 1949 to 1987, China experienced a tremendous 
demographic change with a near doubling of its
population. Since the middle 1970s, China has entered 
the late stages of demographic transition. Because the 
demographic transition was induced by the Chinese
government’s deliberate interventions and efforts in 
order to attain its goals of socio-economic development, 
it is called an "induced" demographic transition. As is 
well known, China is a centralized polity. In such a 
society, the central government has the capability to 
control people's behaviour, including their reproductive 
behaviour. Therefore the attitude of the Chinese leaders 
towards the population problem is one of the decisive 
factors influencing population trends.
During the 1950s, the Chinese leaders did not fully 
realize China's population problem. The serious food 
shortage during China's great famine from 1959 to 1961 
alerted the Chinese leaders to the gravity of the food 
situation. But because of divergence of opinions on the 
population problem, and partly because of the political 
struggles among Chinese leaders which gave them no time 
to attend to population control affairs, China did not 
adopt an effective family planning program until the 
early 1970s. Since 1949, however, whether to allocate 
available national income to improvement of people's 
living standards rather than capital investment has been 
a major problem for Chinese policy makers. On the
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whole, during the period the government adopted a 
development strategy laying stress on capital investment 
at the expense of improvement of people's living 
standards. As a result, in the 28 years from 1952 to 
1978, although the total consumption funds of the whole 
society increased remarkably, the living standards 
hardly improved. Only after 1979, with the implementation 
of China's economic reform programme and rapid economic 
growth, and the slowing down of the crude rate of 
natural increase of population, did the Chinese people's 
living standard begin to rise. So it can be said that 
the Chinese people eat the bitter fruit of population 
growth and of government mistakes.
Of course, China’s huge and growing population, 
combined with the low level of living standards makes 
China a vast potential market. This may have played a 
stimulating role in economic growth. In addition, 
population growth followed by an increase in labour force 
15 years latter can contribute to economic development. 
In fact, a plentiful labour force allowed the policy 
makers to use the "excess" labour as a substitute for 
savings and capital formation to attain economic growth. 
For example, since 1958, the policy makers have used the 
abundant labour force with little or insignificant 
investment in capital construction and the.construction 
of water conservation works for farm land. Using the 
cheap labour force as well as adopting labour-intensive 
technology as a substitute for expensive capital- 
intensive technology allowed China to have macro-economic 
growth for small expenditure. All these factors may have 
been beneficial to China's economic growth. But 
considering the fact that there is a surplus labour force 
totalling perhaps more than 100 million in rural areas, 
and disguised unemployment in urban areas of about 20 to 
30 million, it cannot be concluded that population growth 
and the increase in the labour force in China since 1949 
has been wholly beneficial to macro-economic growth.
However, even if China's huge and growing 
population is not beneficial to macro-economic growth.
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this analysis does not prove the proposition that the 
huge and growing population is a major inhibitor. The 
regression analysis shows that although population 
growth since 1952 has a strong negative correlation with 
the government savings ratio and capital investment 
ratio, there is no significant correlation between the 
population growth rate and rate of increase in national 
income. A possible explanation of this statistical 
result may be that although population growth since 1952 
had a negative impact on government’s savings, especially 
on fixed-capital investment, policy makers managed to 
maintain a quite high savings ratio and a quite high 
capital investment ratio. On the other hand, the 
abundant labour force allows Chinese policy makers to use 
"excess” labour as a form of savings and capital 
formation, as noted above. Counteracting the positive 
and negative impacts of population growth on macro- 
economic growth in China since 1949, it is entirely 
possible to reach a statistical conclusion that China’s 
population growth has no significant correlation with 
China’s macro-economic growth.
Nevertheless, population growth in China since 1949 
has had an adverse influence on economic development in 
view of per capita products. In particular, population 
growth since 1949 has had a very serious adverse impact 
on the improvement of national welfare. From the 
function of national welfare, we know that increase in 
national welfare is directly determined by increase in 
national income, and inversely determined by changes in 
the savings ratio and growth rate of the population. 
The analysis of the function of national welfare has 
exposed the reasons why the Chinese people's well-being 
improved very slowly, even though China maintained a 
relatively rapid rate of economic growth. Now it is 
found that besides the government's past economic 
development strategy of high savings and high capital 
investment, population growth is also a major cause of 
slow improvement in the well-being of the Chinese people.
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The analysis in Chapter Four also has touched upon 
the macro-economic costs of China's population growth 
since 1952. Nearly 87 per cent of the increment in 
available national income was consumed by extra 
population and additional employees throughout the whole 
society. Especially before the 1980s, nearly all the 
increment in available national income was consumed by 
extra people and by additional employees. So the 
fundamental mechanisms which resulted in slowing the 
improvement of people’s well-being and in slowing of 
rise of China's social productivity before the 1980s are 
revealed. Now it can be said one of the causes of slow 
growth is China's population growth.
To sura up, population growth in China since 1949 has 
intricate interlinking relationships with China's macro- 
economic growth as well as economic development. At 
present much of the story about the linkages between 
population growth and* economic development in China is 
still unfolding. Especially because many variables 
related to socio-economic institutions have some feedback 
interplay with both sides, the study of the impact of 
population growth in China on economic development 
becomes more difficult. Even so, this preliminary study 
has shown that China’s population growth since 1949 does 
have a negative significance. But when reaching such a 
conclusion, we must be aware that the major factor 
determining the improvement of the Chinese people’s well­
being is economic growth but not population growth. 
Furthermore, we should be aware also that the major 
factors determining or limiting China's macro-economic 
growth are not demographic variables but China's socio­
economic institutions as well as the government's 
political movements. Therefore, the impact of 
population growth on economic development in China since 
1949 as revealed above can only be correctly evaluated by 
taking the wide environment of China's socio-economic 
institutions into account.
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Appendix Table 1
Historical Population Estimates: China, AD 2-1987
Year Dynasty Population (million)
2 Han 59.6
88 Han 43.4
105 Han 53.3
140 Han 49.2
144 Han 49.7
145 Han 49.4
146 Han 47.6
156 Han 56.5
606 Sui 46.0
705 Tang 37.1
726 Tang 41.4
732 Tang 45.4
734 Tang 46.3
740 Tang 48.1
742 Tang 48.9
754 Tang 52.9
755 Tang 52.9
1014 Song 54.3
1029 Song 63.4
1048 Song 64.3
1065 Song 77.4
1075 Song 94.1
1086 Song 107.7
1094 Song 114.7
1103 Song 123.1
1193-95 S. Song & Jin 122.3
1291 Yuan 59.8
1381 Ming 59.9
1393 Ming 60.5
1749 Qing 176.5
1776 Qing 267.0
1791 Qing 303.0
1811 Qing 357.0
1821 Qing 353.7
1831 Qing 393.8
1841 Qing 411.3
1851 Ging 429.5
1953 PRC 582.6
1987 PRC 1080.0
Source: Durand (1960); Banister (1987); Song et al (1985); 
CSSB (1983).
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Appendix Table 2 Available national income, consumption,
savings and investment (billion Yuan, %)
Year Available nat­
ional income
Cosumption Savings Savings Investment 
ratio (%) ratio {%)
1952 60.7 47.7 13.0 21.4 7.2
1953 72.7 55.9 16.8 23.1 12.6
1954 76.5 57.0 19.5 25.5 13.4
1955 80.7 62.2 18.5 22.9 13.0
1956 88.3 67.1 21.7 24.4 18.1
1957 93.5 70.2 23.3 24.9 16.2
1958 111 . 7 73.3 37.9 33.9 25.0
1959 127.4 71.6 55.8 43.8 28.9
1960 126.4 76.3 50.1 30.6 33.0
1961 101.3 81.8 19.5 19.2 15.4
1962 94.8 34.9 9.9 10.4 9.2
1963 104.7 86.4 18.3 17.5 11.1
1964 118.4 92.1 26.3 22.2 14.0
1965 134.7 98.2 36.5 27.1 16.1
1966 153.5 106.5 47.0 30.6 16.6
1967 142.8 112.4 30.4 21.3 13.1
1968 140.9 111 . 1 29.8 21.1 10.8
1969 153.7 113.0 35.7 23.2 16.1
1970 *187.6 125.8 61.8 32.9 19.6
1971 200.8 132.4 68.4 34.1 20.8
1972 205.2 140.4 64.8 31.6 20.1
1973 225.2 151.1 74.1 32.9 19.5
1974 229.1 155.0 74.1 32.3 20.2
1975 245.1 162.1 33.0 33.9 22.2
1976 242.4 167.6 74.3 30.9 21.6
1977 257.3 174.1 33.2 32.3 21.3
1978 297.5 138.8 108.7 36.5 oo c . Z>
1979 335.6 219.5 116.1 34.6 20.3
1980 369.6 253.1 116.5 31.5 20.2
1981 390.5 279.9 110.6 28.3 17.1
1932 429.0 305.4 123.6 28.8 19.7
1983 477.9 335.8 142.1 29.7 19.9
1984 570.1 390.5 179.6 31.5 20.8
1985 749.8 485.0 264.8 35.3 22.4
1953-57 412.2 312.4 99.8 24.2
1958-62 561.6 388.4 173.2 30.8
1963-65 357.8 276.7 81.1 22.7
1966-70 778.5 573.8 204.7 26.3
1971-75 1105.4 741.0 364.4 33.0
1976-80 1502.4 1003.1 499.3 33.2
1981-85 2617.3 1796.6 320.7 31.4
Note : 1) , The figures in the last column are in proportion to fixed
capital investment in state-owned enterprises in available
national income.
2) , The figures in this table are at the current prices.
Sources: 1), The Department of National Economic Balance,
CSSB, 1987:2.
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Appendix Table 3 Available national incoae, cosuiption and national welfare: China, 1952-1985 (Yuan, l)
Year
Index of
C (5)
A 03 
a 
s? 
!
Cr >C Y
(X) (billion) (billion) 
Cisl-Bi Di=477 Ai Ei=Di/Ci
Index of 
Y (X)
F
Yr
(X)
G
Pop.
(lillion)
H
Gr
(*>
I
W
(Yuan)
Ji=Di/Hi
Index of 
W (*)
F
Wr
(X)
l
1952 100.0 21.4 78.6 477 607 100.0 574.8 83.0 100.0
1953 111.0 23.1 76.9 529 688 115.8 13.3 587.0 2.122 90.1 108.6 8.6
1954 112.5 25.5 74.5 537 721 118.8 4.8 602.7 2.675 89.1 107.4 -1.0
1955 122.7 22.9 77.1 585 758 124.9 5.1 614.7 1.991 95.2 114.7 6.8
1956 132.1 24.4 75.6 630 833 137.2 9.9 628.3 2.212 100.3 120.8 5.4
1957 137.2 24.9 75.1 654 871 143.5 4.6 646.5 2.897 101.2 121.9 0.9
1958 142.6 33.9 66.1 680 1029 169.5 18.1 659.9 2.073 103.0 124.1 1.9
1959 135.9 43.8 ' 56.2 648 1153 190.0 12.1 672.1 1.972 96.4 116.2 -6.4
1960 129.6 39.6 60.4 618 1023 168.5 -11.3 662.1 -1.488 93.3 112.5 -3.2
1961 111.7 19.2 80.8 533 659 108.6 -35.6 658.6 -0.529 80.9 97.5 -13.3
1962 124.0 10.4 89.6 591 660 108.7 0.2 673.0 2.187 87.8 105.8 8.5
1963 138.6 17.5 82.5 661 801 132.0 21.4 691.7 2.779 95.6 115.2 8.8
1964 151.6 22.2 77.8 723 929 153.0 16.0 705.0 1.923 102.6 123.6 7.3
1965 169.3 27.1 72.9 808 1108 182.5 19.3 725.4 2.894 111.4 134.2 8.6
1966 181.8 30.6 69.4 867 1250 205.9 12.8 745.4 2.757 116.3 140.1 4.4
1967 192.0 21.3 78.7 916 1164 191.8 -6.9 763.7 2.455 119.9 144.5 3.1
1968 189.3 21.1 78.9 903 1144 188.5 -1.7 785.3 2.828 115.0 138.6 -4.1
1969 202.9 23.2 76.8 968 1260 207.6 10.1 806.7 2.636 120.0 144.6 4.4
1970 215.9 32.9 67.1 1030 1534 252.7 21.7 829.9 2.94 124.1 149.6 3.4
1971 226.5 34.1 65.9 1080 1639 270.0 6.8 852.3 2.699 126.7 152.7 2.1
1972 239.6 31.6 68.4 1143 1671 275.2 2.0 871.8 2.288 131.1 158.0 3.5
1973 257.1 32.9 67.1 1226 1828 301.2 9.4 892.1 2.329 137.4 165.6 4.8
1974 262.8 32.3 67.7 1254 1852 305.1 1.3 908.6 1.85 138.0 166.3 0.4
1975 274.4 33.9 66.1 1309 1980 326.2 6.9 924.2 1.762 141.6 170.7 2.6
1976 283.2 30.9 69.1 1351 1955 322.1 -1.3 937.2 1.407 144.2 173.7 1.8
1977 291.4 32.3 67.7 1390 2053 338.2 5.0 949.7 1.334 146.4 176.4 1.5
1978 312.7 36.5 63.5 1492 2349 387.0 14.4 962.6 1.369 155.0 186.8 5.9
1979 346.5 34.6 65.4 1653 2527 416.3 7.6 975.4 1.33 169.5 204.2 9.3
1980 382.2 31.5 68.5 1823 2661 438.4 5.3 987.1 1.20 184.7 222.5 9.0
1981 412.4 28.3 71.7 1967 2743 451.9 3.1 1000.7 1.378 196.6 236.9 6.4
1982 442.9 28.8 71.2 2113 2967 488.8 3.2 1015.4 1.469 208.1 250.8 5.9
1983 481.0 29.7 70.3 2294 3264 537.9 10.0 1025.0 0.945 223.8 269.7 7.5
1984 549.3 31.5 68.5 2620 3825 630.1 17.2 1034.8 0.956 253.2 305.1 13.1
1985 632.8 35.3 64.7 3018 4665 768.5 22.0 1046.4 1.121 288.4 347.6 13.9
1953-57 24.2 7.4 2.379 4.0
1958-62 30.8 -5.4 0.807 -2.7
1963-65 22.7 18.8 2.531 8.0
1966-70 26.3 6.7 2.728 2.2
1971-75 33.0 5.2 2.176 2.7
1976-80 33.2 6.0 1.326 5.4
1981-85 31.4 11.9 1.174 9.2
1953-85 30.6 6.2 1.778 3.7
Note: a), C: consuaption; Y: national incoae available; Sr: saving ratio = S / Y; Or: consuaption ratio = C/Y = 1-Yr; 
Yr: annual change of available national incoae; Pop.: year-end population; Gr: annual change of population; 
W: national welfare = consuaption per capita; Wr: annual change of national welfare, 
b), C, Sr, Cr, Y, Yr, W, Wr and indices of C, Y, W are calculated at constant prices.
Sources: 1), The figures in Col.A, B coae froa the Department of National Econoaic Balance. CSSB. 1987.
2), The figures in Col.I coae froa the Population Research Centre, CASS, 1985.
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Appendix Table 4 Consuiption: China, 1952-1985
Year
Consuiption of 
the whloe 
society
Household consuaption Governaent and 
enterprises 
consuaptionTotal Rural resident Non-rural resident
(billion
Yuan)
annual 
change( l )
(billion
Yuan
annual
change(S)
(billion
Yuan)
annual 
change(X)
(billion
Yuan)
annual
chnage(%)
(billion
Yuan
annual
change(J)
1952 47.7 - 43.4 _ 29.8 _ 13.6 - 4.3 -
1953 55.9 11.0 50.8 10.1 33.2 4.6 17.6 22.3 5.1 20.7
1954 57.0 1.4 52.7 2.8 34.8 4.0 17.9 0.6 4.3 -12.4
1955 66.2 9.0 57.5 8.8 38.9 11.3 18.6 3.8 4.7 11.7
1956 67.1 7.7 61.3 6.5 39.7 1.8 21.6 16.3 5.8 21.3
1957 70.2 3.8 64.9 5.1 41.2 3.8 23.7 7.3 5.3 -7.6
1958 73.8 3.9 68.3 3.9 43.5 3.3 24.8 5.0 5.5 4.0
1959 71.6 -4.7 64.1 -8.1 33.9 -22.1 30.2 15.8 7.5 37.3
1960 76.3 -4.6 68.3 -5.8 34.6 -6.4 33.7 -5.1 8.0 4.7
1961 81.8 -9.3 75.5 -6.9 41.8 2.0 33.7 -17.0 6.3 -27.0
1962 84.9 5.5 78.1 5.3 45.9 10.2 32.2 -1.6 6.8 8.1
1963 86.4 11.8 79.3 13.0 48.7 12.4 30.6 ’ 14.0 7.1 1.1
1964 92.1 9.4 84.1 8.7 53.9 11.7 30.2 4.2 8.0 15.9
1965 98.2 11.7 89.5 11.8 58.1 12.4 31.4 10.9 8.7 10.2
1966 106.5 7.4 96.9 7.0 63.7 7.4 33.2 6.4 9.6 11.1
1967 112.4 -5.6 102.6 5.9 67.9 6.9 34.7 4.3 9.8 2.2
1968 1 1 1 . 1 -1.4 102.0 -0.8 67.0 -1 . 8 35.0 0.9 9.1 -7.6
1969 118.0 7.2 106.8 5.5 70.5 6.1 36.3 4.3 11.2 24.7
1970 125.8 6.4 114.5 7.0 77.0 9.1 37.5 3.6 11.3 0.9
1971 132.4 4.9 119.5 3.9 80.4 3.7 39.1 4.4 12.9 14.5
1972 140.4 5.8 126.3 5.4 82.4 2.2 43.9 11.9 14.1 9.5
1973 151.1 7.3 136.4 7.7 89.8 8.6 46.6 6.0 14.7 3.8
1974 155.0 2.2 139.6 1.9 91.5 1.5 48.1 2.7 15.4 4.7
1975 162.1 4.4 145.0 3.7 94.6 3.3 50.4 4.3 17.1 10.7
1976 167.6 3.2 150.2 3.4 96.5 1.8 53.7 6.3 17.4 2.1
1977 174.1 2.9 155.3 2.4 97.4 1.0 57.9 4.9 18.8 7.7
1978 188.8 7.3 167.3 6.5 104.3 5.6 63.0 8.1 21.5 14.2
1979 219.5 10.8 191.0 8.1 121.2 7.7 69.8 8.7 28.5 31.4
1980 253.1 10.3 222.3 10.9 138.4 10.3 83.9 11.8 30.8 6.9
1981 279.9 7.9 247.3 8.3 157.2 10.3 90.1 4.9 32.6 5.3
1982 305.4 7.4 268.8 6.7 173.7 8.5 95.1 3.4 36.6 12.8
1983 335.8 8.6 295.7 8.4 194.1 10.5 101.6 4.7 40.1 9.8
1984 390.5 14.2 339.5 12.5 223.2 13.0 116.3 11.5 51.0 26.6
1985 485.0 15.2 423.5 14.3 272.3 13.4 151.2 16.2 61.5 20.5
1953-57 312.4 6.5 287.2 6.6 187.8 5.1 99.4 9.8 25.1 5.8
1958-62 388.4 -2.0 354.3 -2.5 199.7 -3.3 154.6 -1.2 34.1 3.4
1963-65 276.7 10.9 252.9 11.1 160.7 12.1 99.2 9.6 23.8 8.9
1966-70 573.8 5.0 522.3 4.9 346.1 5.5 176.7 3.9 51.0 5.7
1971-75 741.0 4.9 666.8 4.5 438.7 3.8 228.1 CO 74.2 8.6
1976-80 1003.1 6.9 886.1 6.2 557.8 5.2 328.3 7.9 117.0 12.0
1980-85 1796.6 10.6 1574.8 10.0 1020.5 11.1 554.3 8.0 221.8 14.8
1953-85 5.8 5.4 5.1 6.0 8.3
Note: Consuaption in each year is at the current price; annual change is at coaparable prices. 
Source: The Department of National Econoaic Balance. CSSB, 1987:16, 13.
Appendix Table 5 Average wages and index of workers
and staff in China (1952-1985)
Year
Average 
wage 
(Yuan)
Index (1952 
money wage
= 100%)
real wage
1952 445 100.0 110.0
1953 495 111 . 2 105.8
1954 517 116.2 109.0
1955 527 118.4 110.8
1956 601 135.1 126.5
1957 624 140.0 127.9
1958 536 120.4 111 .0
1959 512 115.1 105.8
1960 511 114.8 102.9
1961 510 114.6 88.5
1962 551 123.8 92.1
1963 576 129.4 102.2
1964 586 131.7 108.1
1965 590 132.6 110.1
1966 583 131.0 110.1
1967 587 131.9 111 .7
1968 577 129.7 109.7
1969 575 129.2 108.3
1970 561 126.1 105.6
1971 560 125.8 105.6
1972 588 132.1 110.6
1973 587 131.9 110.3
1974 584 131.2 109.0
1975 580 130.3 107.9
1976 575 129.2 106.7
1977 576 129.4 104.0
1978 615 138.2 * 110.3
1979 668 150.1 117.8
1980 762 171.2 124.7
1981 772 173.5 123.4
1982 798 179.3 124.9
1983 826 185.6 126.7
1984 974 218.9 145.6
1985 1148* 258.0 153.5
Note: * includes subsidies for foodstuffs.
Source: Social Statistical Department, CSSB (1987).
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ppendix Table 6 Consumption per capita of rural residents:
China, 1952-1985
Year Total 
(Yuan)
Self- support Monetary-
consumption
House and 
entertainments
(Yuan) proportion (Yuan) proportion (Yuan) proportion
1952 62.4 41.5 66.5 20.0 32.1 0.9 1.4
1953 68.7 43.3 63.0 24.3 35.4 1 . 1 1.61954 70.0 42.3 60.4 26.5 37.9 1.2 1.71955 76.3 46.5 60.9 28.5 37.4 1.3 1.71956 77.5 46.1 59.5 29.9 38.6 1.5 1.91957 79.0 46.7 59.1 30.7 38.9 1.6 2.0
1958 82.6 44.0 53.3 37.0 44.8 1.6 1.91959 65.2 23.6 36.2 40.0 61.3 1.6 2.51960 67.9 26.5 39.0 39.7 58.5 1.7 2.51961 31.9 45.7 55.8 34.4 42.0 1.8 2.21962 87.7 43.8 55.6 37.1 42.3 1.8 2.1
1963 89.5 47.2 52.7 40.6 45.4 1.7 1.91964 94.6 49.3 52.1 43.2 45.7 2.1 2.21965 99.8 55.1 55.2 42.4 42.5 2.3 2.3
1966 106.3 59.4 55.9 44.6 42.0 2.3 2.11967 110.4 60.9 55.2 47.4 42.9 2.1 1.91968 105.6 60.7 57.5 42.9 40.6 2.0 1.91969 107.9 60.1 55.7 45.7 42.4 2.1 1.91970 114.1 64.1 56.2 47.9 42.0 2.1 1.8
1971 115.7 65.5 56.6 43.0 41.5 2.2 1.91972 115.6 64.2 55.5 49.2 42.6 2.2 1.91973 123.1 68.0 55.2 52.3 42.5 2.8 2.31974 122.5 65.1 53.1 54.5 44.5 2.9 2.41975 124.4 65.0 52.3 56.4 45.3 3.0 2.4
1976 124.8 64.6 51.8 57.3 45.9 2.9 2.31977 124.5 61.1 49.1 60.3 43.4 3.1 2.51978 131.6 65.2 49.6 63.1 47.9 3.5 2.61979 152.1 71.2 46.8 76.8 50.5 4.1 2.7
1980 172.7 70.5 40.8 96.4 55.8 5.3 3.4
1981 194.4 79.0 40.6 108.7 55.9 6.7 3.5
1982 212.3 84.5 39.8 119.8 56.4 8.0 3.8
1983 235.0 91.3 38.8 134.7 57.3 9.0 3.9
1984 267.8 96.2 35.9 161.3 60.3 10.3 3.8
1985 324.3 102.2 31.5 210.7 65.0 11.4 3.5
=================
jurce: The Department of National Economic Balance, CSSB, 1937:24 , 25.
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Appendix Table 7 Labour force in China, 1949-1985 (million)
Year
Labour force 
Total 7o in pop.
workers
and
staff
ns z z z zz m — zz — zz zz zz zz zz zz zz
self-employ­
ment in 
urban areas
Rural
labour
force
1949 180.82 33.4 8.09 72.4 165.49
1952 207.29 36.1 16.03 88.3 182.43
1953 213.64 36.3 18.56 89.8 186.10
1954 218.32 36.2 20.02 7.42 190.88
1955 223.28 36.3 21.62 6.40 195.26
1956 230.18 36.6 29.77 0.16 200.25
1957 237.71 36.8 31.01 1.04 295.66
1958 266.0 40.3 51.94 1.06 213.0
1959 261.73 38.9 52.75 1 . 14 207.34
1960 258.8 39.1 59.69 1.50 197.61
1961 255.9 38.9 51.71 1.65 202.54
1962 259.1 38.5 43.21 2.16 213.73
1963 266.4 38.5 43.72 2.31 220.37
1964 277.36 39.3 46.01 2.27 229.08
1965 286.7 39.5 49.65 1.71 235.34
1966 298.05 40.0 51.98 1.56 244.51
1967 308.14 40.3 53.05 1.41 253.69
1963 319.15 40.6 55.04 1.26 262.85
1969 332.25 41.2 57.14 1.11 274.0
1970 344.32 41.5 62.16 0.96 281.20
1971 356.2 41.8 67.87 0.81 237.52
1972 358.54 41.1 71.34 0.66 286.54
1973 366.52 41.1 73.37 0.51 292.64
1974 373.69 41.1 76.51 0.36 296.82
1975 381.68 41.3 81.98 0.24 299.46
1976 388.34 41.4 86.73 0.19 301.42
1977 393.77 41.5 91.12 0.15 302.50
1973 398.56 41.4 94.99 0.15 303.42
1979 405.31 41.6 99.69 0.32 305.32
1980 418.96 42.4 104.44 0.81 313.71
1931 432.8 43.2 109.4 1 . 13 322.27
1982 447.06 44.0 112.81 1.47 332.78
1983 460.04 44.9 115.15 2.31 342.58
1984 475.97 46.0 118.9 3.39 353.68
1985 498.73 47.7 123.58 4.5 370.65
Source: The Social Statistical Department, CSSB, 1987:5.
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